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. . . ad Anacleto, possa la tua risata essere
la mia colonna sonora.

v“Today, a young man realized that all matter is merely energy condensed to a slow vi-
bration – that we are all one consciousness experiencing itself subjectively. There’s no such
thing as death, life is only a dream, and we’re the imagination of ourselves. Here’s Tom with
the weather.”
Bill Hicks
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Abstract
The recent advances in data center development have been at the basis of the widespread
success of the cloud computing paradigm, which is at the basis of models for soft-
ware based applications and services, which is the "Everything as a Service" (XaaS)
model. According to the XaaS model, service of any kind are deployed on demand
as cloud based applications, with a great degree of flexibility and a limited need
of investments in dedicated hardware and or software components. This approach
opens up a lot of opportunities, for instance providing access to complex and widely
distributed applications, whose cost and complexity represented in the past a signif-
icant entry barrier, also to small or emerging businesses. Unfortunately networking
is now embedded in every service and application, raising several cybersecurity is-
sues related to corruption and leakage of data, unauthorized access etc. However,
new service-oriented architectures are emerging in this context, the so-called ser-
vices enabler architecture. The aim of these architectures is not only to expose and
give the resources to these types of services, but it is also to validate them. The vali-
dation includes numerous aspects, from the legal to the infrastructural ones e.g., but
above all the cybersecurity threats. A solid threat analysis of the aforementioned
architecture is therefore necessary, and this is the main goal of this thesis. This work
investigate the security threats of the emerging service enabler architectures, pro-
viding proof of concepts for these issues and the solutions too, based on several
use-cases implemented in real world scenarios.
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1Part I
Background

3Chapter 1
Introduction
In recent years we have seen a clear trend on the digitization of services, which has
literally exploded [21].
The last technological advances in data center development have been at the ba-
sis of the widespread success of the cloud computing paradigm, which represented
the foundation for software based applications and services, which is the "Every-
thing as a Service" (XaaS) model.
According to the XaaS model, services from every kind of scenarios (such as,
smart mobility, health, PA, ecc) are deployed on demand as cloud based applica-
tions, with a great degree of flexibility and a limited need of investments in dedi-
cated hardware and/or software components.
This approach opens up a lot of opportunities, for instance providing access
to complex and widely distributed applications, whose cost and complexity rep-
resented in the past a significant entry barrier, also to small or emerging businesses.
It also allowed public administrations and private company to move to the digi-
tal domain their services and business models.
However, new service-oriented architectures are emerging in this context, the
so-called services enabler architecture [14].
The aim of these architectures is not only to expose and give the resources to
these types of services, but it is also to validate them. The validation includes nu-
merous aspects, from the legal to the infrastructural one e.g., but above all the cy-
bersecurity threats.
Unfortunately networking is now embedded in every service and application,
raising a number of cybersecurity issues related to corruption and leakage of data,
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unauthorized access etc.
A solid threat analysis of the aforementioned architecture is therefore necessary,
and this is the main goal of this thesis.
In particular the structure of this thesis is organized as follows:
Part 1 "Background" will be dedicated to investigate the current literature and to
argue the research questions which are motivating this thesis.
In chapter 2 I will review the state-of-the-art of the current new service oriented
software architecture, with a particular focus on the development paradigm used.
Based on this analysis i will define an analysis path for such architectures. This path
will be a top-down approach based on the orchestration level of the enabled services.
Part 2 "Contributions" otherwise will be dedicated to showcase the results obtained,
explaining in details the steps we conducted.
Firs of all I will describe the real-world use case that I developed to support our
security analysis, that is:
• a Clearing System in chapter 4.1.
• a Service Enabler Platform called SMAll in 5.
• a Software Defined Full-Stack Architecture in 6.2 called techNETium.
For each of this use case I will provided a detailed threat analysis, that it will
include all levels of the architectures: network, control and application.
For each threat analysis then, I will propose a set of solutions that can be included
as an architectural component.
Of course, this topic is vast and many future extensions are foreseen. For every chap-
ter I will propose a set of future works to enhance the State-of-the-Art and foster sce-
narios in which contribution and threats prevention are a central enabler; eventually
in Chapter 7 I wrap up the dissertation summarizing the main contributions.
5Chapter 2
Security on Emerging
Architectures: State of the art
2.1 From monoliths to microservice architectures to software
defined architectures
Historically, architectures have always been a big block of codes and components,
dedicated to a specific task, exposing a specific service. Since the last decade, we
have seen a first evolution of such architectures, which became platforms for creating
and managing services and resources, rather than simply being a service.
As main alternatives to these architectures, we consider two architectural styles
for the development of distributed applications: monolithic and Service-Oriented
architectures. We consider these two architectural styles in the left side of Figure 2.1.
The monolithic architecture represents the simplest example of a distributed ap-
plication composed of a client and a server. Following the monolithic approach,
the server consists in a single program deployed into a host. The server program,
depicted in the top-left corner of Figure 2.1, contains the whole logic of the server.
As reference to compare with the other architectural styles, we highlight the main
logic components in the server program. In doing so, we follow the well-known
three-tier approach [43], where the functionality offered by the server program re-
sults from the interaction of three software layers: presentation, application, and
data handling/storage.
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FIGURE 2.1: Evolution of XaaS architectures (top-left, counterclock-
wise).
From the point of view of the hosting platform, we consider the most recent sce-
nario of Cloud deployment [113] and choose the solution that requires the least man-
agement effort for the developer: a Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS) deployment where
the management of host hardware, operating system, data storage (represented by
the DB component in Figure 2.1), and runtime environment are taken care by the
PaaS provider.
Although for small-size applications the monolithic approach is the simplest and
most effective, this architectural model shows its limitations when considering two
important factors: scaling and code-base growth [54, 186]. Indeed, scaling a mono-
lith, both vertically and horizontally, implies the allocation of resources for the whole
server program. Such allocation is usually disproportionate. Inbound requests are
rarely distributed in a uniform way over the components of the server program.
Instead they tend to stress only a subset of said components modules, making the
allocation of the new resources for the less-used components inconvenient [191]. Re-
garding code-base growth, large-size monoliths are difficult to maintain and evolve
due to their complexity: tracking down bugs requires long perusals through their
code base; monoliths suffer from the, so called, "dependency hell" [127] for which
adding or updating libraries to the program results in an inconsistent code-base that
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do not compile/run or, worse, misbehave. In addition, any change in one module of
a monolith requires rebooting the whole application. For large-size projects, restart-
ing usually entails considerable downtimes, hindering development, testing, and
the maintenance of the project.
With the increasing maturity of distributed systems infrastructure, solutions shifted
towards an architectural style that fostered separation and reuse of components. The
intention was to reduce the dependency among the components of a distributed ap-
plication in such a way that they could be deployed in distinct hosts and linked
to each other through standardised protocols and interfaces. These design princi-
ples took the name of Service-oriented Architecture (SOA) [59]. In our depiction of
Service-Oriented Architectures, in the bottom-left corner of Figure 2.1, we divided
the three components of the “Server Program” of the monolithic architecture into
three services, deployed in different hosts, communicating via SOA interfaces. In
Figure 2.1 we marked the possibility to deploy SOA solution over a Platform-as-a-
Service system.
Through standardisation and loose-coupling among components, any resource
that behaves according to the specification of a component of the system can be em-
ployed as such. If said resource fails or becomes busy, it can be replaced with a new,
compliant one by simply redirecting its messages. Modularisation also appeals to
scalability, both in functions and size. Once deployed, a distributed program can
also become a component employed by another program, enhancing its function-
alities with minimal effort. In the same way, since components are modular, if the
workload on a component can be shared, it is possible to add a new instance of the
same component in the system and separate the workload between the two.
Although proposing a sound approach to the development of distributed sys-
tems, the first generation of service-oriented architectures (SOA) defined daunting
and nebulous requirements for services (e.g., discoverability and service contracts
[58]), which eventually hindered the adoption of the proposed model. Microser-
vices, represented on bottom-right corner [96] are a recent reinterpretation of SOAs,
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which abandon their unnecessary levels of complexity, focussing on the program-
ming of cohesive [149] components, each implementing only strongly related func-
tionalities. From a technical point of view, microservices are independent compo-
nents conceptually deployed in isolation and equipped with dedicated memory per-
sistence tools (e.g., databases).[29].
The architectural style of the microservice neither favours nor prohibits any par-
ticular programming paradigm. It provides a guideline to partitioning the compo-
nents of a distributed application into independent entities where everyone faces
its own concerns. That is to say that, provided that a microservice offers its func-
tionalities through the passage of messages, it can be implemented internally with
any of the main languages mentioned at the beginning of this section. The principle
of microservices architectures helps project managers and developers, providing a
guide-line for the design and implementation of distributed applications. Follow-
ing this principle, the developers focus on the implementation and testing of some
consistent features. This also applies to those higher level microservices, which deal
with the coordination of the functionality of other microservices.
The management of these services, which have become real components on inde-
pendent (real or virtual) hardware has led to new methods of orchestration emerging
from these architectures.
The need to control flows and services has therefore become increasingly nec-
essary, both to create and manage the infrastructure needed to create new dynamic
and software-defined technologies, to manage complexity even at network level.
We think trivially about the previous example of a microservice architecture,
where a service is the result of the composition of two microservices, deployed with
the same infrastructure. The possibility that the two microservices (let us imagine
two containers) are totally disconnected, even at hardware level (real or virtual),
would allow an extremely greater reuse of the same microservices. For example, it
would be possible to perform a second deployment on another subnet, to duplicate
it without having to configure each service based on the underlying network. To do
so, however, it is necessary to be able to "define" or "design" the network infrastruc-
ture.
A non-trivial task if we consider that historically, the first two projects based on
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the SDN concept were GeoPlex and WebSprocket. GeoPlex was born from the AT &
T laboratories and was based on the network API and the Java language for creating
a network middleware that mapped the IPs where activities of interest were per-
formed in one or more services. GeoPlex was, therefore, in general, a platform that
managed the association between online networks and services. It was not inter-
ested therefore in the operating systems present on the switches or on routers, since
ATandT only required a "soft switch" that would allow them to reconfigure physi-
cal switches to adapt them to new services on an OSS (Operations Support System,
system for operations support). GeoPlex, however, could not radically change the
configurations of these network devices, automatically and independently of the
systems operational, which thus became a limit, if we consider the current function-
ing of a network based on SDN.
WebSprocket, on the other hand, was composed of two entities: a NOS (Network
Operating System) and a new structured runtime model object-oriented (based on
Java) that could be modified in real time by a compiler and a network class loader.
Further efforts, after 2001 with the advent of virtual LANs [95], were carried out
by several engineers from various companies, but only with CableLabs, via Cable-
Card (a PC card that allowed users to see and record cable television channels) in
2007, it came to the definition of what we today mean by SDN. Further progress
was then made by Berkeley e from Stanford University around 2008. The Open Net-
working Foundation (ONF) finally came founded in 2011 to promote SDN networks
and OpenFlow standardization, a software approach to network design.
Depicted in top-right corner of Figure 2.1 SDN architecture became an emerging
architecture able to merge the need of distributed and heterogeneous application
with a dynamic network infrastructure. The SDN is an architecture design that is
dynamic, manageable and adaptable. The fundamental concept that allows to re-
alize all of this is the decoupling between the actual control of the network by the
controller, and the forwarding functions used by the entities that implement traffic
routing. This enables direct programming of network control and abstraction of the
underlying levels through network applications and services.
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FIGURE 2.2: Top-Down Approach for Emerging Architecture Analy-
sis
2.2 Emerging Architectures a Top-Down Approach
The most difficult task in this context is probably to decide a path analysis. Numer-
ous emerging architectures are increasingly influencing and invading the services
market, for this reason therefore it was necessary for our architectural analysis to
determine which approach to use.
It was also important to try to start from a very specific context, a specific architecture
and generalize as much as possible. For this reason, this work followed a top-down
approach. The meaning consists in the fact that we started from a business-oriented
architecture, strongly dedicated to the vertical service, descending more and more
into the application stack. From the vertical level we have in fact passed to archi-
tectures with orchestrated services and therefore more horizontal, up to those at the
network level.
This architectural style stack, well depicted in figure 2.2, has been created follow-
ing the terms on which we usually classify the Architectural Styles:
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• Components
• The way in which components are connected to each other
• The data flowing through the components
• The way in which all the above items are configured altogether to build the
architecture
• Most important one: the component used to create services
The last differentiation criterion is the most representative one. Descending the
stack we follow at which components level the architecture is able to model services.
The Business-Oriented ones scratch only the surface of the available infrastructure,
using only supports such wrappers, open-data, open-api etc in order to see where
there is a possibility of a service, and then create it.
The microservice-oriented are otherwise able to work both on the top level, where
the services are singularly exposed, but also on the middle level, which means where
the service interacts. The service exposure, the combination of them, and the com-
munications flow become a service opportunity in such level.
As a consequence the bottom layer, the network one, thanks to the SDN paradigm
which allow to design and connect dynamically network infrastructures, the service
creation opportunity reached the network layer, and in this case we are able to pro-
vide solution for all the stack.
According to [173] Software as a Service (SaaS) is a software distribution model
in which applications are hosted by a vendor or service provider and made available
to customers over a network, typically the Internet. Platform as a Service (PaaS) is a
paradigm for delivering operating systems and associated services over the Internet
without downloads or installation. Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) involves out-
sourcing the equipment used to support operations, including storage, hardware,
servers and networking components. The proposed architectures, are therefore a
particular customized scenario of PaaS, because as for microservices architectures
PaaS provides an infrastructure composed by API, ALS etc. that enable the services
once developed, all customized for a specific context.
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We believe that this is the true revolution of emerging scenarios, customized and
contextualized versions of PaaS that enable the creations of services. From the verti-
cal, business-oriented Architectures, to the more horizontal microservices-based, to
the software defined as for the network level.
Such architectures must be seen even as a SaaS architecture because, the platform
components could be interpreted as stand-alone services that could be invoked sin-
gularly. This is an important consideration if we want to present this as a special
case of SaaS and PaaS.
2.2.1 Business Oriented Architectures
The advent of cloud computing and to a lesser extent of the so-called internet of
things world has made new business development and business models possible.
Previously the architectures were ad-hoc monoliths built for a specific service, that,
in order to be created, had to satisfy important economic constraints (due to their
high cost). The possibility of sharing resources, data and standards, given by the
cloud, made new business model possible.
Modern companies had to respond quickly and effectively to opportunities in to-
day’s increasingly competitive and global markets. To promote business agility,
companies should simplify (existing) business processes while exposing various pack-
ages. Home-oriented applications have been spread everywhere by the companies
in a highly standardized way.
The emergence of Web services developments and standards to support automated
business integration has led important technological advances in the area of inte-
gration software, in particular for those architectures identified as business-oriented
architectures. The purpose of this architecture is to satisfy the requirements of free
coupling, based on standards, then distributed independently of the protocol com-
puter science and the mapping of company information systems in a manner ade-
quate to the overall flow of the business process.
The peculiarity of these software architectures is that they are created with a precise
and well-structured business model. The architecture, therefore, allows the creation
of a single type of service, which can be generalized horizontally only to certain con-
texts but still vertically in the business model.
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In these domains, the components that take part on a business process are a subset
of the participants in the service-oriented domain. To model a business-oriented ar-
chitecture we consider roles for process participants, not specific cases, then we talk
about process roles, which will be typed by the participating classes.
A business process in a service-oriented domain is essentially a workflow of calls to
service messages (between pairs of process roles), and of the internal actions of the
roles of the participants (defined activities). The workflow is modelled by an activity
diagram and, as we will see in the next section, it is not part of the service definition.
In such architectures the service components are managed by simple message pass-
ing protocol, and system calls; but this workflow is not part of the service definition.
2.2.2 Microservices/Federated Oriented Architecture
The advent of cloud computing, however, has not only brought the possibility of
new business models, given by the possibility of sharing resources and data. To-
gether with the cloud, new software infrastructure paradigms have also been in-
troduced. Hardware and services can, in turn, be shared and modulated in such a
way as to create new ones. This composition of services is notoriously known as
microservice architecture.
A microservice architecture is a distributed application where all its modules are
microservices. A microservice is a cohesive, independent process interacting via
messages.
For instance, consider a service intended to compute calculations. To call it a
microservice, it should provide arithmetic operations requestable via messages, but
it should not provide other (possibly loosely related) functionalities like plotting and
displaying of functions.
From a technical point of view, microservices should be independent compo-
nents, conceptually deployed in isolation, and equipped with dedicated memory
persistence tools (e.g., databases). Since all the components of a microservice archi-
tecture are microservices, its distinguishing behaviour derives from the composition
and coordination of its components via messages.
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The advent of the world of virtualization and containerization has accelerated
the development of this type of architecture. From the cloud seen as a simple compu-
tational space and resources, we have reached the virtualization of entire hardware
systems, devices or production environments such as virtual machine dockers. Cre-
ating and deploying services through this infrastructure has therefore become much
simpler and more automatic, making the management of microservices easier.
2.2.3 Software Defined Network Architectures
The evolution of the infrastructural cloud has also given a strong boost to the net-
work level. The need to be able to orchestrate not only services at the provisioning
level, or based on what they exhibit (a datum, an aggregate, an api, etc.), but also
at the network level. How they are orchestrated has also become very important.
The need arises to have a more dynamic network level on which it is possible to
manage and orchestrate complex, heterogeneous and volatile infrastructures. Fol-
lowing these needs and motivations, new architectures were created, this time at the
network layer, which fit into this context, the Software-defined networking.
Software-defined networking (SDN) is an agile network architecture designed to
allow organizations to deal with the dynamic nature of today’s applications. SDN
separates network management from the underlying infrastructure, allowing ad-
ministrators to dynamically manage network traffic to meet the requirements needed.
SDN is therefore a network paradigm in which the forwarding hardware is sep-
arated from the logic control, which, in software modules, are called instead con-
trollers (or even Network Operating System, given their similarity to actual oper-
ating systems). The goal is to simplify the management of networks, making them
more flexible and available to the introduction of new technologies. The controller
has a global view of the network, provides the basic services for network manage-
ment applications, and communicates with the devices by forwarding through well-
defined protocols. Forwarding devices do not have instead any logic inside them,
but they memorise the tables filled by controllers, which indicate the actions to be
performed on specific packages.
Briefly, when a packet reaches a switch, if any rules are indicated in the internal
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table for that particular package, the switch will perform the indicated actions, oth-
erwise default actions will be performed, such as communication to the controller of
the arrival of a package not yet managed. The controller, the mind of the network,
will decide what to do with the package and communicate the decision to the switch.
The main advantages of using SDN are [107]:
• Agility: the abstraction of control from routing allows administrators to dy-
namically manage traffic.
• Centralized control: the controller has a global view of the network, allowing
the configuration of the individual forwarding devices from a single point.
• Third-party services: SDN allows integration into third-party service networks
parts (Depending on the controller these services may also be added during ex-
ecution as external modules. In other cases where the controller is monolithic
the controller must be restarted).
• Flexibility, scalability, and efficiency.
• Capital savings: existing hardware can be reconfigured to follow the instruc-
tions of an SDN controller, and more efficient devices from the point of view
cost-performance can be used with great success, given the simplicity of the
forwarding devices used in SDN.
• Global network vision: applications can take advantage of having the same
global view of the network, to impose consistent policies.
2.3 Security
Literature started to address the main security issues related to IaaS, PaaS, and SaaS
since 2008, with the release of OpenNebula, the first true implementation of a Cloud
service. According to [183] an essential list of most important issues encompasses:
• network security (spoofing, sniffing, DoS);
• data security (locality, integrity, segregation, authenticity, confidentiality, pri-
vacy, access control);
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• authentication, identity management, sign-on process, and authorization;
• web application security;
• virtualization vulnerability;
• availability (high availability, disaster recovery).
The change introduced by these emerging architectures has caused new security
vectors to be automatically mitigated, but at the same time new possible attack sce-
narios have arisen. The software architecture is no longer analysed and tested as a
single monolith, but the iterations between the various orchestrated modules, and
the management of the infrastructure become the protagonist of safety analysis.
Let’s discuss about the evolution of security threats among PaaS-like over such
emerging architectures. Considering a smart mobility scenario, to contextualise our
example, we argue that the main differences from most PaaS solutions came from its
intrinsic openness and flexibility. In this context customers can access available data
and services to build and deploy their own services, possibly making them available
to themselves or other customers for the same purpose.
A simple example to clarify this process: a one-stop ticketing application orches-
trates: a) a dynamic planner service that provides the routing options; b) a user pro-
file manager to sort them according to preferences; c) a real-time availability check-
ing/seat reservation service for each operator; d) a set of gateway services for pay-
ment.
Every one of these services is available (and useful) as a standalone application.
It can be the result of a vertical business model for a specific business service, or a
platform for service composition. Moreover, the dynamic planner is not a simple
service: it is the result of orchestrating a static planner with real-time information
about delays, planned extraordinary events, and disruptions. The branches of this
tree can be followed through many levels, until raw data is reached (yielded in a
standard form by a wrapper service).
With these considerations we argue that the security issues known for these ar-
chitectures starts from the well-known typical cloud ones [36]. So hereinafter, we
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outline the specific problems that are most relevant for our context of mobility, with
the mitigation strategy trends.
2.3.1 Emerging threats
As service enabler architectures, they should assume responsibility for the trustwor-
thiness and reliability of the services; this is unusual for "classic" [118]. While it is un-
realistic to expect that they can guarantee complete correctness of data sources and
deployed services, especially under the assumption of being substantially open to
any customer, they should guarantee at least that security is an essential (and value-
adding) service. In particular, it is necessary to define indicators for data quality and
service behaviour, and to devise a way to compute their values for complex data
sources and services resulting from the aggregation and orchestration of existing
ones [61, 55].
As it is made clear in the following discussion, these functions are an important
component of a defence strategy against insider threats, which are likely and dan-
gerous in this studied architecture.
As with the choice of architectural analysis, we needed an approach, a path to
follow, even with regards to the security threat categories, it was necessary to have
one.
As seen the safety challenges are innumerable and of different categories, it was
therefore difficult and counter-productive to think of being able to carry out an ex-
haustive analysis on the whole spectrum.
For this reason we have decided to focus mainly on the so-called insider threat
attacks. Statistically, insider threats are one of the most expensive security issues for
business companies [142]. Cert Research Center 1 states that almost 30% of known
attacks in last years have been made by insiders. One prominent reason of these
expensive outcomes is that companies did not foresee all possible malicious insider
activities [182]. Indeed, the problem is not the lack of proper countermeasures as
much as the difficulty of identifying a malicious insider in the first place. Literature
abounds with guidelines and principles aimed at providing general descriptions of
the context and the identity of the insiders [64, 40]. However, experts agree that
1http://www.cert.org/insider-threat/
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the strong contextual variance of threats [171] makes providing a general yet precise
identification of all possible insiders difficult.
Data Provenance
One of the most studied issues about data sources security is data provenance [178,
24]. Ascertaining provenance means ensuring that the source of data is verifiable,
i.e., that it corresponds to the one declared in the process of creation. In our scenario,
provenance protection is a defence against malicious operators claiming to expose
data of a competitor, forcing them to gain unfair advantage.
Data Trustworthiness
Data trustworthiness, intended as the possibility to ascertain the correctness of the
information provided by a data source, is loosely related to provenance [47]. Ideally,
but infrequently, data samples can be independently measured by different users,
thus allowing cross-checking and error correction. For original data, i.e., provided
by its creator, the trustworthiness score is usually derived from the reputation of
the creator. In this case, it is very difficult to block attacks in which, for example,
the creator advertises a data source of given quality, but then exposes a degraded
version, to keep the advantage of more precise/timely information for itself.
Service Maliciousness
The trustworthiness of a service is an easy concept to intuitively grasp, but difficult
to formalize and to verify in an open environment. In the described service con-
text trustworthiness can be associated with its compliance to a declared function,
and shall be evaluated before the application is admitted to the platform and, ide-
ally, again at every usage. If a service creates aggregated data, processing various
sources, it is necessary to ensure that the computation is correct, that no useful re-
sults are hidden (completeness), and input data is not tampered with (soundness).
These are all likely opportunities for a malicious insider that succeeds in registering
a rogue service. For example, a tampered travel planner could slightly deflect routes
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to favor or damage certain businesses; a modified delay-checking application could
hide or amplify violations of agreed service levels.
Service vulnerability to external attacks
There are applications that exhibit wrong behaviors not because of their malicious-
ness, but because of unexpected vulnerabilities to maliciously crafted invocations.
In this case, there is an external threat in addition to the twofold insider threat: one
in the loose meaning of an insider being so careless as to deploy a vulnerable ap-
plication, the other in the case that another insider is in the best position to exploit
it. For example, a service with extensive access privileges to private data could be
tricked to leak it to a service with much more restrictive access rights. Another ex-
ample, mixing service vulnerability with data provenance issues, is that of a service
that provides crowd-sourced information about the status of the road transport net-
work. Failure to implement an effective fraud-prevention mechanism could allow
an attacker to inject fake reports to influence the behavior of users.
SDN Threats
Generally, the security of an SDN architecture is built around an automated detec-
tion of violations of network invariants on the data plane, possibly in real-time.
The recent work by Beckett et al. [15] shows several tools for finding network mis-
configurations. These tools have been classified in two different categories: control-
plane oriented, i.e., able to discover buggy configurations pro-actively, and data
plane oriented, i.e., able to discover mis-configurations reactively, i.e., observing
events while traffic is flowing. Proactive approaches are particularly useful to pre-
dict potential network misconfigurations that might lead to security issues (e.g., BGP
prefix hijacking). Security attacks, however, are hard to predict. In addition SDN in-
troduced new security threats but has also been able to mitigate many of them [172,
211, 46]. A few comprehensive surveys on the state-of-the-art of today’s SDN secu-
rity solutions is provided by [2, 50, 158, 200]. From the literature it is clear that many
solutions have been proposed but, so far, none of them has been standardized. In
particular Akhunzada et al. [3] provides a detailed taxonomy of SDN threats. In
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this thesis we focus on those classes of threats that compromise the forwarding and
monitoring activity. Examples include:
• multiple compromised network boxes as a result of bugged injected flow-rules,
that may prevent nodes communicating or may divert traffic flows for eaves-
dropping;
• inner loops and black-holes (usually difficult to detect via normal network
scans);
• flow-rules replacement or removal with the aim of causing unexpected net-
work behavior, Denial of Service (DoS) and Man-in-the-Middle attacks;
• any kind of SDN controller exploitation that results in a compromised forward-
ing activity.
We argue that the SDN paradigm provides the perfect platform to pursue this
goal, given the interleaving between control and data planes: in a SDN network
state changes in the data plane are the outcome of what is produced in the control
plane and, at the same time, the control plane has a view of the data plane.
2.3.2 Mitigations
Many of the described problems are intrinsic to the concepts of cloud, SaaS, and data
sharing. For this reason, before being able to develop a solution for data quality and
data provenance, there is a need for a preliminary analysis of all the metrics of these
types of solutions.
Data Provenance
The first thing that we must consider when dealing with services that expose or
elaborate data is to differentiate between data and information.
According to [41], information systems provide data in a certain business con-
text. When data is used by human beings, it turns into information, and information
finally turns into knowledge by being interpreted and linked for a given purpose.
Regardless of such clear theoretical differentiation between data and information,
practitioners use the term "data" in a broader sense.
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As already mentioned, in the context of mobility, verified information is of paramount
importance. There is a need to supports the provision of different sources of data
along with their associated metadata (e.g., used to verify their provenance). How-
ever, it should also provide techniques, embodied by helper services, to transform
those data into verified information.
Data Provenance verification is a known problem in literature. Different ap-
proaches can be taken to support a solution for the problem of recognizing the source
of a data stream. Literature agrees with [79] that the requirements for a provenance
management system are:
• Verifiability: a provenance system should be able to verify a process in terms
of the actors (or services) involved, their actions, and their relationship with
one another.
• Accountability: an actor (or service) should be accountable for its actions in a
process. Thus, a provenance system should record in a non-repudiable manner
any provenance generated by a service.
• Reproducibility: a provenance system should be able to repeat a process and
possibly reproduce a process from the provenance stored.
• Preservation: a provenance system should have the ability to maintain prove-
nance information for an extended period of time. This is essential for appli-
cations run in an enterprise system.
• Scalability: given the large amounts of data that an enterprise system handles,
a provenance system needs to be scalable.
• Generality: a provenance system should be able to record provenance from a
variety of applications.
• Customizability: a provenance system should allow users to customize it by
setting metadata such as time, events of recording, and the granularity of
provenance.
In a microservice architecture, an application is essentially a collection of work-
flows. These workflows can compose many levels of services, each processing and
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modifying the data before its final destination. What we need is a way to certify
the metadata related to a data stream and manage its validity during time and re-
elaboration [187]. Literature generally considers four different sets of techniques [179]:
• Subject of Provenance, in which provenance can either be available explicitly
or be deduced indirectly.
• Representation of Provenance, in which the way provenance is represented
follows from a tradeoff between the cost of recording it and its richness; it is
typically implemented either with annotations or with inversion [17].
• Provenance Storage in which the design of metadata is also important to enable
scalable storage.
• Provenance Dissemination where, in order to use provenance, a system should
allow rich and diverse means to access it.
According to works like [180], this problem could be solved only with a creation
of private and public key system for data stream certification. A good reference is
the system developed in [198], describing a cryptographic provenance verification
approach for ensuring data properties and integrity for single hosts. Specifically, the
authors designed and implemented an efficient cryptographic protocol that enforces
keystroke integrity. However, public-key schemes are known for their significant
computational load, thus existing techniques may not be suitable for high-rate, high-
volume data sources. Moreover, there could be the need for an algorithm for the
provenance of composed data.
In some cases, data originated from the composition of raw (or otherwise "lower
ranked") sources should be accompanied by suitable metadata that allows to verify
the provenance of the input values, in a cryptographically strong way. In our context
it could be important and useful to capture and understand the propagation of data.
In [209], the authors exploit the propagation of the metadata on the various levels
to create a general metadata storage and management layer for parallel file systems,
in which metadata includes both file operations and provenance metadata.
Also Merkle hash trees could be a good candidate to build proofs for composed
data pieces [128]. The combination of metadata propagation with key distribution
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propagation management can guarantee a good level of trust in provenance man-
agement systems. Works similar to [83] discuss how to support provenance aware-
ness in spatial data infrastructure and investigates key issues including provenance
modeling, capturing, and sharing that can be easily used to implement a key propa-
gation system.
Data Trustworthiness
Rating systems are one possible implementation for trustworthiness evaluation mech-
anisms. Auditing services, attribute scores to the data-source services based on dif-
ferent criteria. For example, feedback from users of the data source, or a combi-
nation of reputation scores when the same data can be fed by many sources and
cross-checked. Of course, reputation systems in turn introduce their fair share of
problems [100, 122, 159, 112]. Alternative or complementary solutions are anomaly
detection services based on machine learning and pattern recognition [51]. Then,
as cited for provenance, the emerging architectural context should automatically
compute the trustworthiness score of data originated from the composition of other
sources, based on their scores.
Service Maliciousness
In principle, the service deployment interface can verify the correctness of an appli-
cation before accepting it. In practice, this operation is very hard to perform. One
indicator of correctness is the compliance to a template of acceptable interfaces for
the kind of service the application provides. However, it is very difficult to define
templates strict enough to allow sensible compliance checks, but general enough
to avoid hindering the deployment of legitimate services. Another way to check
correctness is to look at the actual behavior of the application, as it is common in
anti-malware checks, through static analysis, verifying the code to discover possible
malicious behaviors. These techniques are far from infallible, and their scope falls
much shorter than what is required in our context. Indeed, in this context a mali-
cious behavior can be a subtle deviation from the correct calculation [140], which is
far more difficult than the detection of traditional malicious behaviors (e.g., damag-
ing or self-replicating ones).
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A more promising technique is that of dynamic analysis of malware [60]. A way
to discover a malicious behaviour of a service is to implement a mechanism that
could guarantee, in every moment, a reproducibility of the results. Taking advantage
of the data provenance, certifications of raw data, and of its propagation to results,
it is possible to implement a reference monitor to verify the compliance of results to
the expected values. In case of conflict between the declared results and the actual
ones, it could be discovered what has been tampered with: the source data, or the
service logic. In the first case, this detection can also feed the data trustworthiness
rating system.
Service vulnerability to external attacks
Main prevention to implement is provide input sanitization, or in general, Intrusion
Prevention System / Intrusion Detection System as a service, to protect applications
from most of the malicious invocations. Tracing cross-callings between services can
thwart insider attacks aimed at privilege escalation. This can be done by taking into
account the whole set of access control rules before allowing unauthorized data to
leak in or out through a careless application.
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Chapter 3
Motivations and Research
Question
In this chapter we will outline the major contributions of this thesis dissertation,
with respect to what we argued has been the state-of-the-art and its evolution on
Chapter 2 and as a consequence of the considerations that we introduced in Chapter
1.
With this short chapter we aim to bind the two parts of the dissertation together
– Part I is about how the current research evolved in the last 10 years wrt to SOA
and Part II is about what is being presented as a contribution to the State-of-the-Art.
In particular, we will localize where our research work fits into the big picture, to ex-
tract the challenges and develop specific use cases according to the related scenario
on which we focused and, most importantly, why we think it is important and worth
it.
First of all we will briefly describe the context in which our architecture study
was done. Despite our analysis can be considered as general as possible, to support
our arguments it was necessary to create several real use cases. These use cases have
therefore fallen into real, functioning and currently in use application contexts. They
are obviously derived from projects activated and concluded between our research
team, companies in our area of influence, government agencies and other research
institutes.
The architectures we have developed have therefore fallen into two main con-
texts: smart mobility and MaaS, and industry 4.0, which we will describe in the next
section.
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3.1 Context: Smart Mobility and Industry 4.0
3.1.1 Smart Mobility and MaaS
In recent decades, public transport services steadily profited from the introduction of
new technologies. The means of transport became faster, less polluting, more com-
fortable and accessible. The interaction of passengers with transport services became
easier, as ticketing and payment systems went from paper to electronic and on-line
planning and real-time information systems became available. Through more effi-
cient exchange of information, transport operators began to see the interoperabil-
ity between competitors as an added value (for example: coordination at transfer
points can lead to better service, attracting more customers than it would happen by
aggressively competing for the same route).
Mobility as a Service [164] is an innovative approach to the integration of pub-
lic and private transport, made viable by the integration in a coordinated infras-
tructure of the technologies illustrated in the previous section. Born in the city of
Helsinki, this paradigm is starting to spread throughout Europe and beyond, aim-
ing to establish standards for the interoperability between different (even in terms
of country) operators, and to encourage the creation of alternative solutions to the
standard ”mass transit / private car” duality, as both new technologies and social
trends emerge [124].
Very briefly, the principle of MaaS is that as long as every detail of the demand
and supply for transportation services is known in real-time, there is no need for
passengers to commit on specific means. Instead, they will enjoy a broad spectrum
of alternatives from which to choose, taking into account the needs of the moment.
For example, one could specify a very strict set of constraints in terms of comfort and
timing, likely to result in a choice of premium means, while another could simply
express the need for reaching a destination at the best price, getting a virtual ticket,
and receiving real-time instructions about which means to use to complete the trip.
Many business models are possible. In the simplest form, a MaaS operator could
simply be a smart broker for planning and paying trips on existing networks.
A more innovative way would be selling mobility packages allowing travelers to use
pre-configured amounts of usage of different means. From the transport operators
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viewpoint, a MaaS platform could be a great opportunity to leverage integration
and to exploit unused capacity. For example, a taxi company exposing vehicle avail-
ability and position in real-time could offer lower prices during off-peak times, thus
appearing as a good alternative to mass transit; data-mining could allow operators
to foresee correlations between various conditions (events, weather, accidents) and
transportation needs, to allocate materials in the best possible way.
Ideally, the ICT infrastructure enables these models by tracking timing, position, and
availability of trains, buses, subways, shared bikes, shared cars, taxis, Uber cars, Lyft
cars, etc. in an overall effort of opening data and standardizing the interfaces to ac-
cess them [193].
In short, in a mobility context, both the users and the operators can benefit from the
smart definition of trips, provided enough availability of data and efficiency of pro-
cessing is available. This is exactly the kind of challenge IoT architectures are up to
[165].
Thus, the role of public administration can undergo a significant change. Some
administrations could choose to play the role of a central MaaS operator, exerting a
stronger control on the local mobility agenda. Others could leave the field to private
companies, hoping to benefit from market-driven optimization of citizens’ patterns
of mobility. They could also accurately monitor citizens, using collected data to plan
investments and direct incentives towards specific goals. The first scenario allows
for a more respectful and regulated approach to citizens’ privacy while the second
leaves room for malevolent or misleading collection and use of data.
One example of the latter is Google legal advisor David Drummond’s defensive re-
ply to the question about future uses of data collected by their driverless car [154].
According to authors, it is too early to regulate over the driverless-car about data
collection and uses, because it is not yet foreseeable what is worth (implicitly ’for
the company’). In any case, governments will need to face the challenges MaaS pro-
vide, and to think about needed regulatory changes to make it viable for innovative
cities. The adoption of MaaS will sustain a transition from a public transport system
traditionally coordinated by the government to a multi-faceted system where exert
coordination through the help of other actors. For example, determining who is in
charge of setting the standards will affect business and consumers in parallel with
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data protection policies.
It is worth noticing that, in many places, this change could introduce significant
trust issues. The organization of transport infrastructures by public bodies guar-
antees (at least in principle) that travelers’ interests are safeguarded. In a fuzzier
scenario, it could be very difficult to verify how sensitive data are processed and by
whom, as detailed in Sec. 4.4.
3.1.2 Industry 4.0
The Industry 4.0 (I4.0) paradigm is an initiative started in Germany that is gaining
worldwide momentum in smart factories[110].
The level of complexity of communications between sensors, actuators, and con-
trol centers required in I4.0 scenarios calls for a new generation of Industrial Net-
works, with demanding levels of performance, reliability and security.
Such revolution comes in hand with Software Defined Networking (SDN), that also
brought a significant paradigm shift: network programmability has introduced sev-
eral advantages, and not only for programmability of the forwarding plane. At the
same time, SDN have significantly expanded the attack surface and the space of
reachable and exploitable vulnerabilities, within the (physical or virtual) network as
well as within each connected system.
SDN can be used to design industrial networks that meet all requirements de-
rived by current standards, yet its growing complexity calls for new generations of
management architectures. Such architecture should be abstract enough to subsume
any possible application scenarios within the realms of I4.0 and IoT.
3.2 Security Analysis
3.2.1 The Insider Threat Problem
Having defined the context in which we developed our architectures we performed
the security analysis of the enabled and exposed services. Following the state of the
art of chapter 2 we can see that the problems are found on different levels of the
architectural stack; include numerous agents and for different purposes.
3.3. Use Cases and motivations 29
In fact, we immediately noticed how an in-depth security analysis would have been
very extensive, and not possible in the timing of our use cases.
Furthermore, through interviews and discussions with our business partners,
we have defined that despite the wide spectrum of possible attacks within this type
of architecture there was a particularly widespread and sensitive one, namely the
insider threat.
As well explained in chapter 5.4, statistically, insider threats are one of the most
expensive security issues for business companies [142]. One prominent reason of
these expensive outcomes is that companies did not foresee all possible malicious
insider activities [182].
For these reasons, our security analysis, although centered on all levels of archi-
tecture, will mainly focus on identifying and solving insider threat problems, going
superficially, or not considering, the other common agent attackers.
3.2.2 Policy Enforcement oriented Solutions
The proposed solutions as a consequence will be based on preventing the previ-
ously described attackers. The study of the solutions in particular will be structured
as follows. Through the study of possible threats a categorization of services and
vulnerabilities will be developed. A definition of the security policies to be applied
to prevent certain attacks will therefore be created on this categorization.
For each policy and architecture a solution will therefore be proposed that is
developed, tested and deployed showing as how our study can be applied in a real
and practical use-case.
3.3 Use Cases and motivations
Finally, let us try to summarize in this last paragraph of the following chapter how
the motivations and the research questions have structured the work of this thesis.
The main purpose of this thesis is to study the security issues of some of the emerg-
ing software architectures resulting from the evolution of cloud computing, the XaaS
paradigm, and more generally the new business models on software architectures.
For these studies, however, despite an intense phase of literature and state-of-the-art
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study it was necessary to create a real use case on which to carry out tests and eval-
uations.
Obviously the use case could not be NOT contextualized, for this reason, also thanks
to our collaborations, we have created different use cases in the context of smart mo-
bility and industry 4.0. These use cases have been applied in several other parallel
and/or complementary projects, resulting in further scientific publications that have
just validate more the usefulness of our use case.
We therefore go backwards in the path.
Starting from a specific use case we studied the security issues related to the insider
threat. From this specific use case we proposed and used a process of categorizing
the elements of the architecture so that it was as general as possible and therefore
also applicable to other contexts. From this categorization we therefore produced an
analysis of the insider threat security problems, which wanted to be as general as
possible.
On this analysis we therefore produced security policies aimed at mitigate these
threats. Finally, to validate our research, we proposed a practical implementation of
these policies, in a way of a development component of the software architectures
created as use cases.
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Chapter 4
Privacy-Preserving Design for a
Clearing System Architecture
The current trend in management of public transport systems is to outsource ser-
vices to multiple private operators, requiring them to integrate their ticketing and
fare system with one another. When this concept is introduced in regions that used
to have single local entities managing every aspect of ticketing, or that conversely
left operators free to adopt incompatible, separate ticketing systems, a new layer of
coordination must be put in place.
There are many examples of this kind of approach around the world, such as
the Oyster card system in London, the Octopus card system in Hong Kong, or the
Istanbulkart in Istanbul just to name a few. As a case study, this thesis considers the
Emilia-Romagna region of Italy, where the Regional Government has been running
for several years a project to integrate the control processes of the various transport
companies operating in the region. These companies typically operate over disjoint
territories, and they used to manage independent and localized ticketing systems.
The trend with the new regional system is to go more and more towards inte-
gration of tariffs, routes and ticketing, so that the citizen may buy a ticket in city by
a given operator and use it in another city with another operator. While providing
an improved service to citizen this approach also brings some additional burden,
since a clearing system is needed to share the revenue of tickets sales according to
the actual service each operator has provided (and thus, supposedly, to the real costs
it has incurred). Data detailing every trip, collected by public transport operators,
previously confined to internal use only, now must be shared and can potentially
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harm passengers.
The system that manages it does not merely need to control data disclosure, but
has to be designed to manage potential risks during the collection and processing
of data. This is a challenging task, which must manage privacy risks appropriately
on the one hand, and preserve data utility to a level that guarantee usefulness for
clearing purposes on the other hand.
This first contributions chapter of this thesis illustrates the work done and need
to design and test the clearing system in a way that safeguards the protection of
personal information, not as a result of some policy superimposed to the existing
functions, but rather taking into account this requirement from the start, by applying
the principles of Privacy by Design.
Contributions Contributions on this Chapter are organized as follows. In Section
4.1 the local context and the general ideas behind the clearing system are briefly
presented and reviewed, and research questions are stated. Section 4.2 gives an
overview of the general principles of data sanitization for the purpose of safe release
of sensitive information. Section 4.3 illustrates the risks connected with the release
of sensitive information, focusing on the desanitization attacks that exploit public
data sources, and Section 4.4 gives two examples of how these attacks can affect the
clearing datasets. Section 4.5 describes the general principles of Privacy by Design,
and outlines the direction of current and future work to apply them to the scenario
of the clearing system, before conclusions in Section 4.6.
4.1 Context Scenario
4.1.1 The local context
The Emilia-Romagna Region has approximately a population of 4.5 Million with an
area of 22500 square Kilometres. About half of the population leaves in the 13 main
cities that are lined along the ancient Roman road called "Via Emilia" which gives
its name to the Region. Emilia-Romagna is highly industrialized with a number of
companies typically spread along the Via Emilia around the main urban centres. For
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this reason the mobility infrastructures are a key part of the logistics supporting the
economy of the region.
The estimate of daily trips made by Emilia-Romagna citizens for work or leisure
is about 9 Millions of which 25% walk or bike and 8% by public transport means.
The public transportation system is built around a rail backbone basically parallel to
the Via Emilia which links the main urban centres. Local transportation systems in
the cities mostly use buses. The local systems are run by four large operators and a
few small operators on specific routes.
The policy maker is the regional Mobility and Transport Councillorship which is
competent, among many subjects, for the planning of the infrastructural network, re-
gional and local mobility systems. Over the last decade the Councillorship pursued
service integration and multi-modality of public mobility systems, promoting, in
particular, the deployment of regional integrated fares with an investment of about
20M euro in supporting hardware (central control systems, ticketing machines, ve-
hicle monitoring systems etc.).
The issue of the MiMuovo (I move) chip card was the flagship project of the fare
integration process, supporting multi-modal tickets valid over a given path span-
ning several operators and transport means. For instance a user holding a MiMuovo
card with an integrated travel contract is allowed to use the bus (run by operator
A) in his home town to reach the railway station, the train (run by operator B) to
his/her working town and the bus (run by operator C) to his/her working place. To
date about 300,000 MiMuovo cards have been deployed and are used daily.
Trend is also fostering fare integration for single trip tickets that can be bought
in any town and used in any other within the Region. This requires the operator
selling the ticket to share the revenue with other operators, if they are involved in
its use. This is called clearing process, and has to be implemented in a way accepted
fairly by the whole set of operators involved, to guarantee the integrated system
sustainability.
4.1.2 The clearing Service System
The clearing system is based on a vertical smart mobility service architecture in
which each operator is responsible for the management and maintenance of its own
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data. The data needed for the computation of the clearing function is collected in
a clearing database located in a central processing centre, operated by a regional
in-house company, in order to guarantee neutrality and to avoid disturbing the pro-
duction systems of the operators.
The creation of the clearing database requires the sharing of the operators dataset
in a standard, machine readable format, thus creating a possible threat as a conse-
quence of secondary uses. Moreover the regional Councillorship aims at using the
data for in-depth analysis of the transport system performance. Eventually, part of
the datasets could be released to the public as open data.
Operators and public bodies do not have any effective control over future uses
of their dataset once it is publicly available. Unfortunately the data about sales and
usage may reveal issues the operators consider part of their industrial secrets and/or
sensitive information in terms of personal privacy.
This problem can be (partly) mitigated by applying full anonymization safe-
guards, which is very difficult when the utility of the database has to be maintained.
Moreover, it is possible to adequately inform the involved subjects of the intention to
disseminate the dataset in an open data format, alerting them to potential risks, but
this action can limit the degree of user acceptance, especially if the policy intention-
ally leaves open what kind of secondary uses of their data will be done. Therefore a
trivial solution to the issue does not exist.
4.1.3 Research questions
From the point of view of the users, in the widest sense that encompasses passen-
gers, operators, and regulators, the most pressing questions to be answered are:
with the current data storage and utilization processes, is it possible to breach data
privacy and re-identify the data subjects? Which kind of processing and links to
people and business-related issues are possible, for example by matching the clear-
ing database data with other external databases? From the point of view of the
researchers, these questions can be answered by analysing the underlying scientific
and technical tools: what features do the current data sanitization algorithms ex-
hibit? Is it possible to measure their effectiveness in any given scenario? Symmetri-
cally, can the experience gathered from similar projects in other cities/regions point
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our research in the right direction, or are our requisites too specific?
Once the background analysis is complete, if it highlights deficiencies either in
the basic technologies or in their application to specific scenarios, the research activ-
ity will be directed towards the definition of a more effective framework for public
transport data sanitization.
4.2 Sanitization: a critical overview
The architecture outlined in Section 4.1.2 introduces two possible security attack vec-
tors. The first one is the intrusion of an unauthorized party, in which data are sub-
tracted from the primary database; this is a classical issue of information security
and access control, and this work does not deal with its direct form; yet, it takes into
account the similar situation of purposely releasing data for public use, considering
that it could be enriched though correlation with external data sources, to the extent
of disclosing details that should not be made public.
The second one is called an insider attack, also referred to as an insider threat;
this type of attack arises due to a malicious threat from somehow authorized actors,
from inside the organizations that are legitimately involved in data collection and
processing; the next chapter illustrates ways to perform this kind of attacks and
corresponding effects.
A data sanitization phase is commonly proposed in the literature as the necessary
step to prevent these issues; this phase as defined by [44], is "the process of altering
[a dataset] so that it remains usable for beneficial purposes, while minimizing its
use for harmful purposes". To properly define this process, the key issue to deal
with is to understand what "keeping the beneficial purposes" and "minimizing the
harmful purposes" mean. Ideally, the process should be able to manipulate the data
in a way that prevents privacy attacks but at the same time preserves the possibility
of performing many kinds of economic computations.
To progress towards this goal, the existing literature is analysed to find (a) whether
convincing measures of utility and vulnerability of the dataset exist and (b) whether
existing algorithms result in positive trade-offs when applied to our context. The
literature was analysed as follows. Starting from the basic requisite of having to
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anonymize the data, the generally-applicable techniques of data anonymization were
reviewed, highlighting their limitations.
Next, the application of these techniques to the clearing scenario was attempted,
taking into account the literature on the evaluation of these techniques, namely ver-
ifying the impact of their known limitations, and introducing metrics that allow to
determine whether a satisfying level of privacy is attained.
Subsequently, the symmetrical path was followed, starting from similar cases
for which documentation of the process of transport data privacy protection exists,
such as those of Montreal and Amsterdam. However, the analysis of the various
aspects highlighted that, even though there are important points of contact, these
experiences did not need to take into account some requirements that turn out to
be of critical importance for the clearing scenario. As a consequence, the techniques
devised for those systems would leave ours subject to numerous types of attack,
both of kinds already known in the literature, and of other kinds described in this
dissertation as proofs of concept.
4.2.1 General-purpose sanitization approaches in the literature
As a preliminary consideration, to understand the way algorithms manipulate datasets
to achieve the aforementioned results, it is useful to note that every approach is
based on the classification of data elements according to the potentially sensitive
information in three categories [206]:
Identifier attributes (or identifiers) can individually distinguish the data sub-
ject more or less directly. Typical identifiers include: name, address, social security
numbers, mobile phone number, IMEI number.
Quasi identifier (or key) attributes can be used to identify a data subject using
auxiliary sources of information, by linking to databases that contain identifying
information. They are indirect identifiers of a data subject, which make an individual
more distinctive in a population. Typical key attributes include: age, race, gender,
date of birth, and place of residence.
Sensitive (or secondary) attributes cannot individually identify a data subject
directly and may require significant amounts of auxiliary data to be useful for re-
identification purposes. A data subject may then be identified individually through
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more sophisticated methods such as fingerprinting, rather than mere linking of databases.
Examples include settings in an application, battery level measured over time, or lo-
cation patterns.
In summary, the literature describes four main techniques of data anonymiza-
tion.
k-anonymity [163, 129] is the most well-known technique for generalization. The
basic principle here is to replace exact values with ranges, wide enough to guarantee
that every attribute in a database appears with identical values in a given number
of other rows, forming a group of k rows indistinguishable from each other. This
approach may take the form, for example, of grouping subjects’ locations into suffi-
ciently large areas such that no set of locations is unique to any individual.
The enforcement of k-anonymity requires the preliminary identification of the
quasi-identifier. The quasi-identifier, as previously defined, depends on the external
information available to the recipient, as this determines her ability to make corre-
lations (not all possible external data sources are available to every possible data re-
cipient); different quasi-identifiers can potentially exist for a given table. Many vari-
ations and improvements exist, yet k-anonymity techniques cannot hide whether an
individual is in the dataset, and it performs poorly in protecting sensitive attributes
against attacks based on background knowledge or on the knowledge of the details
of its application [188].
l-diversity [116] is an improvement of k-anonymity that require the sensitive at-
tribute associated with each quasi-identifier to appear at least with l different values.
Other refinements have been proposed, but as described also in [195] processing a
large dataset to achieve l-diversity is time-consuming and vulnerable to inference
attacks in presence of a series of updated publications of the same dataset, if it is sim-
ply re-anonymized with the same approach every time. Finally the added require-
ments proved to be neither necessary nor sufficient to prevent sensitive attribute
disclosure (Li et al., 2007) [111].
t-closeness [111] To improve robustness of k-anonymity, the same authors of l-
diversity also proposed a privacy notion called t-closeness, which requires that the
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distribution of a sensitive attribute in any equivalence class is close to the distribu-
tion of the attribute in the overall table (i.e., the distance between the two distribu-
tions should not be greater than a threshold t). In other words, an equivalence class
is said to have t-closeness if the distance between the distribution of a sensitive at-
tribute in this class and the distribution of the attribute in the whole table is no more
than a threshold t. A table is said to have t-closeness if all equivalence classes have
t-closeness.
Differential Privacy is a process derived from cryptography. As defined in
[56], it "aims to provide means to maximize the accuracy of queries from statisti-
cal databases while minimizing the chances of identifying its records." Unlike other
methods, differential privacy operates off a solid mathematical foundation, mak-
ing it possible to provide strong theoretical guarantees on the privacy and utility
of released data. The most used technique is called ε differential privacy and it is
modelled via a randomized algorithm; a theoretical definition is given in [196] and
summarized as follows.
"A randomized function K gives ε-differential privacy if for all data sets D and
D‘differing on at most one row, and all S ⊂ Range(K),"
Pr[K(D) ⊂ S] >= exp(ε) x Pr[K(D‘) ⊂ S]"
This formula can be interpreted as stating that the risk to one’s privacy should
not substantially (as bounded by ε) increase as a result of participating in a statisti-
cal database. Namely, that an attacker should not be able to learn any information
about any participant that they could not learn if the participant had opted out of
the database. This goal is pursued by adding some noise to the result of a query
on the dataset. There exist many different mathematic mechanisms to do that; the
most commonly seen in this context is the Laplace mechanism, which adds noise
derived from the Laplace distribution. It has only one parameter, defining the stan-
dard deviation, or noisiness. This parameter should have some dependence on the
privacy parameter, ε; it should also depend on the nature of the query itself, and
more specifically, the risk to the most different individual of having their private
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information teased out of the data.
Differential privacy comes in many different forms and variations which we will
not cover in detail, but they all have several limitations, due in particular to the high
computational complexity that the cryptographic techniques could introduce in a
big dataset. The main advantage of this approach is that its mathematical foundation
makes it possible to actually measure the strength or the weakness of the results. The
concept of differential privacy holds much potential, and is still the topic of active
research.
4.2.2 Sanitization in the Clearing Scenario
To ascertain the suitability of the illustrated techniques to the clearing scenario, the
first step is to define the correct evaluation criteria, which could depend from:
• The context of collection and usage of the data;
• The structure of the data;
• The objective of data processing.
As an example, the work of [23] measures the trade-off between privacy (i.e.,
how much the adversary can still learn from the sanitized records) and utility (i.e.,
the residual accuracy of data-mining algorithms executed on the sanitized records
with respect to what could be found for legitimate purposes from the original data
set). Their paper showed that k-anonymity provides no privacy improvement on
the tested dataset; furthermore, l-diversity is no better than trivial anonymization.
Another interesting work [42] tries to quantify the effectiveness of sanitization
in terms of privacy impact of a data release. To this end, the study introduces the
idea of incorporating a metric over ’privacy breaches’ based on a notion of empirical
privacy, and evaluating the corresponding empirical utility of the released data.
The measure of a privacy breach is defined as the increase in correct a-posteriori
inferences obtained by an adversary about sensitive values in the data, using a
Bayesian classifier with previous knowledge. The cited paper applies this metric
to the main four techniques, and concludes that differential privacy often provides
the best empirical privacy for a baseline utility level, but that for increasing utility
42 Chapter 4. Privacy-Preserving Design for a Clearing System Architecture
levels it can be preferable to adopt methods like t-closeness or l-diversity. There
are other works that pursue the same kind of investigation, that mainly derive as a
conclusion the weakness of k-anonymity and l-diversity algorithms.
The main limitation of the reviewed literature is that only few papers interact
with large amounts of data derived from public transport system. An exception is
the work in [70], which aims at preventing privacy attacks in a general sense, espe-
cially those damaging from a user’s perspective. The proposed solution is an algo-
rithm based on the LK-privacy model, using the approach of "identifying the LK-
privacy requirement, and then eliminating the violating sequences by a sequences
of suppressions with the goal of minimizing the impact on the structure of the user
tracking." What the authors claim is that their anonymization algorithm thwarts
identity record linkages, while effectively preserving the information quality in terms
of its suitability for the generation of a probabilistic flow-graph. It is a very inter-
esting result, yet insufficient in the scenario of a clearing system, where the user’s
privacy perspective is not the only one that must be protected; in fact, the insider
threat is not taken into account.
Eventually, with the exception of differential privacy (which cannot be easily ap-
plied to huge amounts of data), it would seem that not a single sanitization solution
is really effective. Actually, these studies demonstrate only how these techniques
are not effective enough for the particular context taken into consideration. To prop-
erly evaluate their potential in our scenario, a more precise definition is needed for
various characteristics, namely:
• the privacy requirements;
• the expected level of utility of datasets;
• how to measure the effectiveness of algorithms at preserving these properties.
As regards privacy requirements and utility levels, it is possible to reason in our
case study, on the structure of sensitive values and quasi-identifier. The sensitive
values are the user’s identity and location data; these values are the one to hide and
protect. The means of transportation and the user’s contract data, otherwise, can
be classified as quasi-identifier values, since they could become sensitive if crossed
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with other information; at the same time, these are the data needed to calculate the
clearing functions, so they cannot be depleted because of the precise information
they carry. The goal of the anonymization process is to break the link between user
identity and location, and to mask the QI values in a way that preserves the values
needed for the clearing system.
As regards the metric used to quantify privacy, the best work done in this path is
[144] were authors created a metric called δ-presence to evaluate the risk of identi-
fying an individual in a table based on generalization of publicly known data. This
work shows that existing anonymization techniques are inappropriate for situations
where δ-presence is a good metric (specifically, where knowing that an individual is
in the database, as it very often happens to travellers of public transportation net-
works).
So, despite its quality in general terms, this metric cannot be used in our context.
Otherwise, the metric discussed in [67] is defined as the amount of "useful" data
mining queries still existing after the sanitization phase. As shown in the following
section, an insider threat attack in our context is likely to take the form of a search
pattern analysis; for this reason this measure of privacy seems to be more interesting.
4.3 Security Analysis
In our scenario, the clearing datasets could be exploited by any of attacker cate-
gories wishing to infer information regarding the operators’ business and/or the
passengers of the public transportation system. Moreover, there is a specific insider
threat: the participating companies may try to use data analysis to gain competitive
advantages, both of the kind usually associated with market analysis (e.g. uncom-
monly profitable routes) and of the kind usually regarded as a trade secret (e.g. the
optimization of the allocation of resources such as buses, trains, and personnel on
board).
The main issue is that when pursuing their goals, adversaries are not limited
to the analysis of the clearing data alone. Conversely, they can reap great benefits
through correlation with many existing public databases. The first widely known
case of identification through correlation of different public datasets dates back to
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2006, when AOL released anonymous data about search queries and New York
Times reporters were able to find the real user linked to a specific hash [13].
As noted by [19] this case also shows a peculiar effect of the failure of the pri-
vacy protection: since the user acted as a proxy for friends with no Internet access,
her name was associated to many queries unrelated to her condition and habits.
The same could happen with public transportation data. As an example, if zones
of boarding and alighting are kept wide enough to conceal the exact location of a
passenger, they could end up enclosing points of interest (hospitals, schools, recre-
ational facilities, shopping districts, etc.) which could lead an attacker to draw
wrong conclusions, possibly even more damaging to the victim than the correct ones.
A final example of the risks associated with location data is carried by the study
of possible privacy breaches as a consequence of the traces left when renting bikes
in London. This is a very relevant case for this work, since the kind of data used
in the studies described hereinafter is strikingly similar to what could be found in
our datasets. Here [176] authors analysed a publicly available Transport for London
dataset that contained records of bike journeys for London’s bicycle hire scheme over
a period of six months between 2012 and 2013, reaching the conclusion that "with a
little effort, it’s possible to find the actual people who have made the journeys".
4.3.1 Specific attack scenarios in our context and countermeasures
The kind of correlation with external databases exemplified in the previous section is
feasible in our context too. Not only it is possible to leverage online social networks
in the same way, but also to browse many free-access databases of sensitive data,
strongly related to the regional context. Just to give two examples, it is very easy to
extract from the corresponding web sites all the professional data information (such
as office address, office telephone number etc.) of the regional health organization
staff, as well as of the university staff in all the cities that have an academic insti-
tution. These data are not sensitive if taken alone; in fact, the transparency laws of
the public administrations mandate their availability; as shown in the next section,
it is their combination with the public transport dataset that could allow privacy
breaches.
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If this were not enough, as explained previously the same sanitization algorithm
are not free from attacks. In particular when there is the need to keep a good level
of utility, algorithms as k-anonymity have been proven to be weak against attack
where the adversary have a previous ("a-priori") knowledge. The work of [116] and
the l-diversity algorithm have been created to overcome these de-anonymization
issues of k-anonymity. As well explained in [70], anonymizing public transport data
structured over a space with a high number of dimensions has been studied widely,
but in general none of the proposed solutions takes into account the clearing scenario
with its peculiar requisites about utility. In [70] the differences between the different
methods are clearly detailed.
[71] propose a permutation method that groups transactions with close proxim-
ity and then associates each group to a set of mixed sensitive values. [184] propose
an algorithm to k-anonymize transactions by generalization based on some given
taxonomy trees. [84] extend this method by introducing local generalization, which
awards better quality. [199] extend the k-anonymity model by assuming that an ad-
versary knows at most a certain number of transaction items of a target victim, which
is similar to our assumption of limited background knowledge of an adversary.
This is a very interesting model because it is definitely related to our scenario.
It deals with attempts to gain a basic knowledge of some transaction rows, which
is equivalent to get a certain number of possible travel records of a user: a valuable
outcome for an attacker in our context.
Yet, although their method addresses the high-dimensionality concern, it con-
siders a transaction as a set of items rather than a sequence; this makes it useful
to prevent attacks against the privacy of single users, but not to prevent attempts
at general pattern discovery, which is typical of insider threat attacks. Therefore, it
is not fully applicable to our problem, which needs to take into consideration the
sequential ordering of travel data. Furthermore, [199] achieve their privacy model
by merely global suppression, which significantly decrease information quality on
transport data.
The last reviewed model was developed by [38]. It studies the releasing of trans-
port dataset while satisfying differential privacy techniques. Although they claim
that their approach maintains high quality and scalability in the context of set-valued
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data and is applicable to the relational data, their method is limited to preserving in-
formation for supporting count queries and frequent item-sets, as opposed to [199],
and not passenger tracking. The combination of these two pieces of research is a
very promising research direction towards a complete solution for our scenario.
4.4 Case Studies
This section presents some simple case studies built along the lines of the illustrated
threats, showing how such concepts may easily be applied to the case under consid-
eration. Two different threats are considered:
• an attacker who tracks the movement of a specific person (one of the authors)
on the public transport network, exemplifying a threat to the privacy of indi-
viduals;
• an attacker who is interested in understanding what are the more profitable
areas in terms of regional tickets sold, to challenge the business of an operator,
exemplifying a threat to trade secrets of operators.
A summary of the data items collected by operators for each ticket validation
is described in Table 4.1. The definition of the minimal subset needed for clearing,
and the anonymization of the selected fields, are the goal of the work in progress
described in this section. However, it is immediately possible to notice that the most
sensitive attribute and the only direct identifier (in case of personal passes), i.e. the
serial number of the ticket, cannot be omitted.
Following its usage through the dataset (possibly over a period of time that can-
not be known a priori) is the main function of the clearing system, which has to
compute the share of revenue (generated when the ticket was bought) to distribute
to each carrier which provided service to the ticket holder. In a broader sense, it is
possible to define the required utility level of the dataset as being very similar to
the goal of a potential attacker: that is, allowing to reconstruct a traveller’s itinerary.
It is worth detailing how this reconstruction happens, to understand also how an
attacker could try the same process and follow a traveller.
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TABLE 4.1: Dataset Item Summary
Field name Content
CONTRACT SUP-
PORT
Type of physical token
CONTRACT TYPE Type of contract (single trip, pass, etc.)
VALIDATION TSP Timestamp of ticket usage
VALIDATOR LOCA-
TION
Placement of the validating equipment
CONTRACT RE-
SELLER
Company which sold the ticket
VALIDATION LINE Bus/tram/train line number
VALIDATION NR Number of parallel validations of the same ticket (e.g.
many passengers on a single pay-as-you-go ticket)
VALIDATOR SERIAL Serial number of validating equipment
CONTRACT SN Serial number of the ticket
VALIDATOR
MODEL
Model of the validating equipment
VALIDATION ZONE Fare zone where the ticket was validated
CONTRACT VALID-
ITY
Geographical extension of the contract (regional, urban,
etc.)
CONTRACT ZONES Number of fare zones the contract allows to traverse
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The itinerary is "blurred" within the dataset, because in the studied system pas-
sengers validate tickets only when boarding a bus/train, but not when leaving it.
Consequently, raw data does not show a sequential structure; each row represents
a leg of a trip for a contract, but there is no direct connection with the next legs of
the same contract. Each leg can be represented by a structure like (A)T1→ (B..Z),T2
meaning that on time-stamp T1 a user (Contract_SN) goes from A in a known direc-
tion (inferred from Validation_Line) leading to a set of possible stops, one of which
is reached at T2. This introduces uncertainty in the computation of the number of
traversed zones, which is needed by the clearing system when a vehicle of a differ-
ent operator is used to continue the trip: in this case, the end of the first leg must be
inferred from the validation that happens at the start of the second one.
To this end a probabilistic flow-graph can be exploited. According to [70] a prob-
abilistic flow-graph is a tree where each node represents a point in space-time, the
edges corresponds to transitions between two places, leaving the origin at a given
time to reach the destination at a different time, and each transition has an associated
probability of being actually followed. For every node, there may also be a non-zero
termination probability, which is the percentage of passengers who exit the trans-
portation system at the node. By looking for validations of the same contract that
are consecutive within a given time-frame, a possible itinerary can be identified.
For example, if a validation (A)T1 could take a passenger to (B..Z), and there
is a validation (D)T2, with the value of (T2-T1) falling within a given threshold, a
non-zero probability can be associated to the edge (A)T1→ (D)T2. The analysis can
proceed seeking for destinations that can be reached from (D).
Table 4.2 and Figure 4.1 depict an example of the probabilistic flow-graph de-
rived from one of our datasets for a few contracts. With enough samples, proba-
bilities can be estimated with acceptable precision, and the graph becomes a faith-
ful enough representation of the distribution of passenger over the network. At
the same time, each set of itineraries for a given contract represents the habits of a
passenger, enabling correlations with other data sources (places around the nodes,
events close to the timestamps), and potentially leading to the association between
the contract and a personal identity.
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TABLE 4.2: Probabilistic flow path of our dataset
Serial Content
70001112 (1, 245)T1->(2,249)T2->(3,248)T3->(1,245)T4
0004058 (1, 245)T3->(1, 245)T4-(1, 245)T6
50004077 (4,260)T1->(2,249)T2->(1, 245)T5
50004070 (1, 245)T1->(2,249)T2
70001386 (1, 245)T3->(2,249)T4
70001389 (1, 245)T1->(2,249)T2->(1, 245)T4
FIGURE 4.1: Travel data represented as a probabilistic flow-graph
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4.4.1 Stalking Franco Callegati
FIGURE 4.2: Commuting flows from Imola to Bologna and Cesena
As a proof of concept, let us present the case of an attacker who wants to target
one of the authors, to track his movement on the public transport network. Franco
Callegati is a professor at the University of Bologna. He has a public web page
detailing the address of his office which is located in the off-site campus of Cesena,
about 60 Km East of Bologna, and showing that he works at the Department of
Electrical, Electronic and Information Engineering, which has its central offices in
Bologna. The phone directory lists his home address in Imola, a smaller town about
30 Km east of Bologna.
Clearly from this basic data it can be inferred that Callegati will mostly travel to
work from Imola to Cesena where he teaches and tutor students, but he will likely
travel to Bologna too, for those sort of activities requiring physical presence related
to the Department or to the University’s central offices. Sometimes he will also travel
from Cesena to Bologna (or the other way) when he has some commitment in both
sites in the same day.
With this background, an attacker who has got a copy of the clearing dataset can
associate the victim’s identity with the serial number of his MiMuovo pass. Calle-
gati is admittedly a very easy target, yet he serves us well for the purpose of giving
4.4. Case Studies 51
a concrete and real example of usage of clearing datasets. Given the almost non-
existent effort that allows a potential attacker to reach his goal, there is little doubt
that "harder" targets can be exploited with some more, but still reasonable effort; as
already illustrated at the end of previous section, even a coarse localization of com-
muting start and end points, when correlated with some background information
about the victim, can yield significant results.
The dataset shows about 2,000 passengers boarding trains that leave Imola in
the morning (all figures are computed as averages on working days). Since the val-
idation occurs only at the start of the trip, their destination is not explicit, but of
course it can be inferred with a good approximation by coupling the onward trip of
a given ticket with the return trip. This further analysis yields slightly more than
1,000 passengers getting back from Bologna in the afternoon (Fig. 4.2, pink arrow)
and slightly less than 200 passengers getting back from Cesena (Fig. 4.2, grey arrow).
The number of candidates drops dramatically when only passengers who travel al-
ternatively to both Bologna and Cesena in different days of the week are considered.
Only 14 MiMuovo users show a commuting pattern of this kind (Fig. 4.2, red arrow).
The possible inferences do not stop here. It is easy to check that the Callegati’s
office in Cesena is near enough to the train station (15 minutes on foot), and that it
is not conveniently served by public transport (direct bus only once an hour). An
attacker could make an educated guess that Callegati will not take a bus when he
leaves Cesena’s train station, and thus eliminate candidates who do it. Conversely,
the site of Callegati’s department in Bologna is twice as far from Bologna’s train
station, compared to the Cesena situation, and much better connected to it by bus (6
to 8 connections per hour).
In this case an educated guess would lead an attacker to consider the exclusion
of candidates who do not board a bus in Bologna after reaching the train station.
Note also that the clearing function can be computed without taking into account
the line number, but in case the full database is leaked, or in case the line number
is kept on record for secondary uses, it would be possible to further restrict the set
of candidates to those boarding one of the two bus lines connecting the train station
with the department, out of the 19 serving the train station.
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In our tests, this is enough to pinpoint the victim. This result was reached with-
out even taking into account another very valuable source of information, the timetable
of the lectures in Cesena, which would allow establishing a precise spatio-temporal
constraint to the victim’s movements towards one of his usual destinations. In con-
clusion, by following these patterns, an attacker can identify Callegati’s MiMuovo
card ID and then follow his movements also outside his most common habits by
accessing the clearing database.
4.4.2 Unfair competition
FIGURE 4.3: Results of a clustering analysis of the dataset with Weka
Ticket validation datasets contain potentially useful information for an operator
wishing to uncover the business practices of its competitors or challenge their busi-
ness practice. This kind of attack comes from the inside, and it is very difficult to
deal with. Access control rules cannot be very strict against insiders, who enjoy not
only the possibility of easier read-only access to datasets, but also the opportunity
to inject carefully crafted data to stimulate the production of particularly useful out-
puts, like a cryptanalyst that is able to perform a chosen plaintext attack. One of the
most valuable pieces of information would be the planning strategy in the usage of
vehicles, which is a crucial issue for a transport provider and that can be inferred at
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some extent by exploiting the information in VALIDATION ZONE, VALIDATION
LOCATION, and VALIDATION LINE.
Here a simple and realistic inference is shown, built by looking at the correlation
between the type of ticket and the zone of its usage. It is a piece of information
that can give a very small margin of profit by pushing sales of multi-trip tickets
where they are most appreciated, making profits on the rate of unclaimed trips for
lost tickets (what is not claimed for clearing remains in the pockets of the seller).
This should clearly be a small percentage of the whole ticket volume. Nonetheless
in today’s competitive markets every source of income may be vital; moreover the
examples show that this sort of analysis may pave the road to similar analyses in
“business areas” which are not considered today, because they are impossible to
accurately explore in absence of large datasets.
We performed Over 30 data mining tests over the ticket validation datasets using
the Weka software [82]. The correlation of interest was best highlighted by means of
cluster analysis, i.e. a set of exploratory techniques that aim to group the unity of a
population in statistics on the basis of their similarity in terms of values taken by the
observed variables. As an example, Figure 4.3 shows the result of cluster analysis
according to the Simple K-means_1 classifier. It is clear that the attributes of the sold
tickets form well-separated clusters, whose significance can be useful from a busi-
ness perspective. Once this hypothesis is verified, a Bayesian_2 classifier allows to
infer more details over some attributes. The structure of the clearing system allows
an attacker to feed the Bayesian classifier a large amount of past knowledge from the
snapshots. The result is that the algorithm is able to correctly predict the belonging
to a given cluster of over 90% of new instances.
This result needs to be interpreted in a specific context in order to show the
power of this kind of attacks. The Bayesian test shows that theoretically, by knowing
only the contract type and the validation zone, it is possible to infer the correct serial
number of the contract support, which would reveal the pseudo-identity of the con-
tract holder. Beneath the privacy risks for the contract holder, this discovery would
allow a company to determine the history of a pseudo-identity. This history would
be revealing the type of contract, along with its movements, leading to a kind of
profiling and possible definition of targeted offers that is usually regarded as unfair
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competition in our context.
A more general attack is also possible, again by using the results from cluster
tests. Cluster analysis usually aims to group the elements of a population on the
basis of their similarity, in terms of values found in the observed variables. However,
if the focus is put on a particular attribute, for example the contract type, it becomes
possible to trace the trend in terms of other variables, for example (see again Figure
4.3) how the contract is used in a group of specific zones. This could easily lead an
operator to discover the contract distribution of a competitor. So by intercepting this
market trend, once again, the opportunity may arise to engage strategies deemed as
unfair competition.
4.5 Mitigation Policy Guidelines
In order to take the described factors into account when designing the clearing sys-
tem, we propose to undertake an iterative approach described by the following
steps:
• Data minimization - take into account the needs of the legitimate analysers to
define the smallest set of attributes that allow performing the intended com-
putations;
• Sanitization techniques - choose the perturbation and generalization algo-
rithms that provide the most effective concealment of sensitive data without
jeopardizing its utility for legitimate uses;
• Verification - evaluate the results to formally verify that the privacy policies
are respected and that the resulting dataset actually preserves its intended
utility. If some basic constraint is found violated, or margins for further im-
provement are visible, the cycle is reiterated to achieve the foreseen refinement,
otherwise the process stops. Note that this step could highlight an intrinsic
contradiction between some of the privacy policies and some of the analysis
requirements, leading either to the decision to relax some requirement or to
the conclusion that the desired scenario is unachievable.
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The last step of the iterative process calls for a formal metric to evaluate cor-
rectness and effectiveness. The literature already provides useful methodologies
for this purpose. Here authors [67] studied the general problem of fusion resilient
anonymization. They stated the problem as a search for the optimal value of an
objective which is the weighted sum of protection and utility. Protection is mea-
sured in terms of how hard is for an adversary to gain information by correlating the
anonymized dataset with external sources. More formally, if P is the original sensi-
tive dataset, and P I is the sanitized release of P, an adversary can exploit information
fusion techniques to derive a de-sanitized version P‘from P I. The effectiveness of the
applied sanitization process is measured as the dissimilarity between P‘and P .
Brickell and Shmatikov [23] performed a similar analysis, again studying the
trade-off between utility and protection, but on a more formal level. Their claim
was quite thought-provoking: sophisticated anonymization techniques offer no real
advantages over trivial ones, i.e. datasets sanitized with complex application of gen-
eralization and perturbation algorithms, depending on the algorithm parameters, ei-
ther provide no additional utility vs. trivially-sanitized datasets, or leak much more
information to adversaries than what is gained in terms of legitimate analysis. Be-
sides posing interesting questions that researchers in this field could find useful to
orientate their efforts, their paper also provides formal definitions for various met-
rics related to privacy of data tables and utility of sanitized databases. In particular,
they study privacy both under a syntactic perspective (pure statistical correlation)
and under a semantic perspective, measuring the gain in adversarial knowledge af-
forded by the sanitized table.
Bishop et al. [19] explore the topic by focusing on relationships that can be used
to desanitize sensitive data. They model the problem of data sanitization as a double
set of assertions, made of the constraints defining the privacy properties that must
hold against adversarial attacks, and of the targets defining the information that the
legitimate analysts want to extract from the sanitized dataset. They highlight the
importance of defining a precise threat model as a requisite for drawing complete
and concrete privacy policies, and a precise analysis policy that, in opposition to
the privacy policy, puts limits to the sanitization process to avoid excessive loss of
utility. They exploit ontologies to automate reasoning over these opposing requisites
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and solve the constraint satisfaction problem they represent. A question they leave
open is: what is the most appropriate language to express these requirements?
To define our specific privacy by design process, we plan to investigate and pos-
sibly apply the common concepts and techniques presented in all of these works,
in addition to a specific and noteworthy suggestion that comes from the last one.
In the words of the authors: “Perhaps the most constructive approach is to provide
two sets of relationships. The first lists those relationships that are known to hold in
the raw data, and must not hold if desanitization is to be prevented. The second is a
set of relationships that, if they held, would enable desanitization. The sanitizer can
deal with the first set as appropriate. The second enables the sanitizer to perform a
simple risk analysis, centred on two questions: (1) What is the probability that the
relationships in this set hold; (2) What is the probability that the adversary will be
able to determine that the relationships hold, and use that to desanitize the data?”.
This approach seems to be especially useful because it allows both designing sani-
tization by evaluating the effectiveness of the planned techniques, and to measure
and understand the risks deriving from future evolution of the intended use of the
datasets.
4.6 Conclusions
This chapter of the dissertation highlights the privacy threats that can emerge from
sharing or publishing the data related to usage of public mobility tickets. In the
context of an integrated mobility system run by a set of operators, sharing data about
tickets usage become mandatory for revenue clearing purposes. Unfortunately this
may also pave the road to privacy attacks to individuals or institutions, such as, but
not limited to those exemplified in this thesis.
A discussion is presented of how the sanitization approaches could work in this
scenario, and what their limitations are; it lays the ground for future research aimed
both at improving the effectiveness of sanitization techniques in the specific scenario,
and to derive generally-applicable principles.
As an alternative solution, the applicability of a set of principles derived from
the "privacy by design" approach is examined. In the context of the design of the
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data sharing system for clearing purposes, its aim is to minimize the likelihood of
the emergence of privacy threats. The general-purpose definition of the approach is
integrated with an implementation plan that takes into account a variety of literature
sources to verify the effectiveness of the applied methodology, in order to iteratively
converge towards the solution that strikes the most appropriate balance between
data utility and privacy, possibly quantifying the effects of a breach.
The first set of research questions, regarding the suitability of existing techniques
to protect privacy in the public transport scenario, has thus being answered in a
substantially negative way.
The second wave of research questions, on the possible definition of a more effec-
tive framework to devise privacy-enhanced data management processes, has been
partially addressed. The present study meets its main limitations here: the negative
findings from the review phase, and the realization that similar initiatives actually
deal with less demanding requisites, were useful in highlighting the deficiencies of
current approaches and lead to devise suggestions on how the framework could be
structured, yet its concrete development will be the subject of future work.
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Chapter 5
SMAll: A Global Federated Market
for MaaS Operators
Multi-modal travelling is a common phenomenon. Commuters, tourists, and trav-
elling workers are used to compose trips out of legs covered with disparate means:
bike, car (personal, rented, hailed, or shared), bus, train, boats, and planes. Usually,
each ”hop” requires interaction with a different operator and, mostly, with a differ-
ent information system, since mobility resources are administrated and owned by a
scattered plethora of mobility operators. As noted in [151], this is due to regulatory
and logistic constraints that favour site-specific solutions. Hence, the experience of
multi-modal travelling results often into a discontinuous flow of interaction, scat-
tered over many applications, having a negative effect on both mobility providers
and customers. The former suffer opportunity costs due to the loss of potential clients
that could not find or know about their services. On the other side, the customers
undergo many inconveniences, culminating in a sensible waste of time. Reasons
comprise:
• uneven experience: customers may have to plan their trips over separate systems
and different media with inconsistent interfaces and flow of interaction (e.g.,
calling a taxi via phone and then continuing the trip on train, whose ticket was
booked online);
• access issues: although multi-modal planning services have become freely avail-
able (e.g., mapping services provided by Google and Microsoft), customers
still need to find out what provides information on their trips. They have to
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look for places, phone numbers, and dedicated applications or websites to re-
trieve information and book the trips.
• interaction issues: once customers found what means provide information on
their trips, they have to negotiate how to get those information, dealing with
multiple authentication systems, extracting data from different representations,
and aggregating them to obtain a comprehensive plan of the whole travel.
Each step increases the risk of introducing inconsistencies or missing key pieces
of information.
In addition to the time lost by customers and missed opportunities of mobility providers,
there are strong concerns regarding data replication and security. When users interact
with multiple, separate systems within the same travel (i.e., to plan/book one of its
legs), they are likely to replicate information that is already present in another sys-
tem. However, since they have to manually replicate such data (e.g., their IDs, dates
of the trip, or personal needs), they could introduce discrepancies among legs. As
an example, consider the steps from a multi-modal travel-planning application to
the actual booking of the travel. Although the travel-planner holds information on
each leg of the travel, the customer has to manually replicate a subset of such data
when she books each leg, managed by a different operator. Also the security of the
data of the travellers plays an important role [29]. Customers have to provide their
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personal data to systems that guarantee uneven security measures, making difficult
or even impossible to assess the level of security of the whole process.
Mobility as a Service a possible solution to the issues illustrated above is the cre-
ation of a unifying framework for mobility that supports the coordination of dif-
ferent transportation systems. Such an idea has been envisioned and described in
several works in the last decade [120, 121, 151, 73]. Recently, this idea has materi-
alised in some practical applications inspired by the concept of Mobility as a Service
(MaaS) [155]
Analogously to the case of Cloud Computing (conveyor of the everything-as-a-
service paradigm), MaaS hides a dynamic infrastructure of different travel agencies
into a consistent interface: this makes MaaS users experience travelling as provided
by a single agency. Ideally, a MaaS provider, also called MaaS operator, shall provi-
sion its users with information and procedures for discovering, planning, booking,
and guiding journeys, combining any variety of means of transportation. To the
final user, the provisioning of mobility resources (i.e., information on transportation
and the actual transits) is transparent wrt the actual provider of the service. Since
mobility resources are administrated and owned by disparate mobility providers,
we argue that the leading economic model of MaaS markets is that of federations
of providers, each trading its mobility resources. In such a federated market, MaaS
operators dynamically partner with each other whilst preserving their individual
autonomy and without a centralised regulation authority which, in the case of trans-
portation, would be practically impossible to appoint.
Contributions in this chapter we present several contributions. First, we introduce
the MaaS Stack (section 5.2): this is the first tiered view that provides a structure for
the, so far, informal concept of MaaS. The MaaS Stack originates from our discus-
sions with companies interested in entering the market of Mobility as a Service, as
well as from investigations conducted within the EU EIT Digital project SMAll1. We
deem our view useful to isolate and clarify which elements must be in place for
mobility operators to join the MaaS market, possibly becoming themselves MaaS
operators.
1Project description: https://goo.gl/WKnnSW
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The second contribution is the presentation of a microservice-oriented platform
called Smart Mobility for All (SMAll)2,3 (5.3), developed to support the creation of a
federation-based MaaS market and which is structured according to the principles
of the MaaS Stack. SMAll facilitates the publication, automatic retrieval, and orches-
tration of functionalities for mobility, provided by different mobility operators.
The platform builds on the concept of Federated Cloud Computing [160, 25] and
maintains an open approach wrt the possible members of the federation: MaaS oper-
ators, traditional transport agencies, and other players that trade information linked
to mobility, like weather forecasts or crowd-sourcing communities [90].
SMAll is developed following the microservices paradigm [54] and members are
strongly supported in publishing their functionalities as microservices. As remarked
in section 5.3.1, such architectural choice positively impacts on both SMAll and the
resources deployed by members, which enjoy great flexibility, gradual deployment
and continuous integration, eased software maintenance and, most important, effi-
cient scalability according to dynamic demands.
Next, using the SMAll platform we will propose two real world use case sce-
nario of SMAll applications. A Federation of Platooning Operators for smart truck
mobility, and Cloud-of-Things interpretation of Smart Mobility.
Another important contribution will be an extensive security analysis of the main
security issues in such architecture. We will explain why we mainly focused on
insider threat attacks and in this part the contributions will be of two types. We will
first produce a taxonomy concerning a general architecture approach, based on the
previously predefined MaaS stack, and we will also show a more specific analysis
on the two use cases implemented.
As a consequence, lastly we will show the proposed solutions for this scenarios,
consisting in a overlay network for data management and a business policy enforce-
ment.
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5.1 Context Scenario
In this section, we overview the concept of MaaS and illustrate the main features of
SMAll with a representative instantiation of our platform, depicted in Figure 5.1. In
the remainder of this dissertation, we use the term service to indicate an application
deployed within or outside SMAll, while we use the term microservice to indicate
an instance of a service within SMAll4. In Figure 5.1, the coloured entities outside
of the boundaries of SMAll (bordered with double lines) are providers of mobility
resources and MaaS operators. These are public transportation agencies, private
companies, and online communities. By entering the platform, each member can be
dynamically federated with the other agents already present. Once in SMAll, mem-
bers can deploy their own functionalities as microservices, e.g., in Figure 5.1, the City
Bus operator deploys three services: the first two are Bus GPS Proxy and Timetable
Proxy, which function as wrappers for some pre-existing applications deployed in-
house by the operator. The third service, Bus Delays, is completely contained in the
platform and orchestrates the other two services of the Bus Operator to calculate the
delays of buses by comparing the actual GPS position of the rides with the expected
scheduling from the timetables.
SMAll provides helpers (e.g., Registry / Discovery and Dispatcher) to publish,
discover, compose, and regulate the usage of the deployed microservices. Consid-
ering the example above, although all the microservices belong to the Bus Operator,
all the invocations from the Bus Delays service are routed and managed by the Dis-
patcher. The Dispatcher also enforces the usage Business Policies defined by the
2Wiki: https://github.com/small-dev/SMAll.Wiki/wiki
3Deployable platform: https://hub.docker.com/u/smallproject/
4Hence, to a service correspond one or more copies of the same microservice that implements its
functionalities.
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owner of the invoked service, e.g., it can refuse to proxy the invocation to the ad-
dressee as well as to delay frequent requests if they exceed the rates established by
the owner.
Business Policies are fundamental for marketing on-demand services. As an
example, consider the case in which the City Bus Operator integrates the crowd-
sourced data on Route Network Disruption in its Bus Delays service (e.g., to forecast
day-long delays on the interested routes). With SMAll, using such crowd-sourced
data does not require the presence of pre-existing contracts of usage between the Bus
Operator and the Crowdsourcing Operator. By accepting the business policies for-
malised by the Crowdsourcing Operator, the Bus Operator can dynamically access
(and pay for) the Disruption information.
Finally, different SMAll installations can be federated as well, so that region-wide
instances can constitute a federation of international- and world-wide platforms.
Consider, for example, a MaaS operator that wants to provide transportation solu-
tions to its users travelling abroad. It would be unthinkable for the MaaS operator
to foresee and stipulate contracts of usage in advance with all the possible foreign
transport agencies. On the contrary, with SMAll a MaaS operator can automatise
the dynamic aggregation of foreign federated services for its users, letting them ac-
cess transport solutions of other operators. Moreover, like the other members of the
platform, also MaaS operators can deploy services.
For example, in Figure 5.1 the MaaS Operator deploys a Journey Planner and a
Trip Handler. The latter, in particular, is the service that orchestrates the dynamic
multi-modal trips for the users of the MaaS Operator. To do that, Trip Handler in-
teracts with the Dispatcher to reach and orchestrate the other federated services: it
uses information on scheduling, availability, disruptions, and the position of buses,
trains, and on-demand cars to dynamically plan a multi-modal trip, booking and
paying the rides for the user.
5.1.1 SMAll: Smart Mobility for All
In this section, we illustrate the proposed approach with a real-world use case de-
veloped within the recent EU EIT Digital project SMAll. As part of the project, we
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investigated the suitability — in terms of development, interoperability, and scal-
ability — of SMAll wrt the creation of new smart mobility applications, possibly
integrating pre-existing services.
As a real-world example, we report one of such applications, which we imple-
mented as a pilot, called BusCheck. The pilot, commissioned by the Department of
Transportation of the government of the Emilia-Romagna (ER) region (Italy), aims at
recoding and displaying the quality of service of the buses in the Bologna province.
Figure 5.2 represents the architectural view of our solution, composed of interact-
ing services (continuous boxes) and external functionalities (dotted boxes) owned
and provided by three organisations: the ER regional government, the University of
Bologna, and TPER, the bus agency of the Bologna area. In Figure 5.2, we omit Reg-
istry, Discovery, and Dispatcher helpers that enable interaction among the deployed
services (explained in section 5.3.1).
As shown in Figure 5.2, BusCheck emerges from the composition of four ser-
vices deployed within SMAll (double-line in Figure 5.2): i) Administrator is a ser-
vice owned by the ER government and used by operators to schedule and issue
the tracking of buses. Operators interact with the service through a in-house client
GUI outside SMAll. ii) Tracker is a service developed and maintained by the Univer-
sity of Bologna. It implements the actual logic to track buses. The service relies on
two sub-services: a Tracking Scheduler that, based on the timetables of the tracked
bus, triggers the retrieval of its real-time position; a Delay Calculator that computes
the divergence between the expected and actual positions of the tracked bus. iii)
BusAgency is a service maintained by the Bus Agency. It exposes to the Tracker the
static and real-time data on all the vehicles of the bus agency. iv) Database is a service
owned by the ER government that interacts with the Tracker, receiving data on de-
lays and serving them internally to regional operators for both real-time and static
inspection.
5.2 The MaaS Stack
For the clarification of the concept of MaaS, we deem useful to define it as a tiered
structure, called the MaaS Stack. We use such partition in section 5.3 to analyse the
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elements of MaaS markets and the solutions we integrated in SMAll.
Figure 5.3 represents the MaaS Stack, comprising 3 tiers (dashed lines): eMobil-
ity Operator, Business Intelligence, and MaaS Operator. Inside the tiers, we identify 4
macro-layers of services (rounded rectangles), each building on top of the others:
the Information layer contains basic services like timetables and real-time positions;
Travel and User services build on Information ones to offer more advanced features
to users; Business Intelligence services analyse data on performance and usages of the
aforementioned services, providing insight to their owners; Federation services let
operators trade their solutions and form dynamic partnerships.
In the next sections we analyse in depth the tiers of the MaaS Stack and the layers
that characterise them.
5.2.1 Towards Mobility as a Service
Recently, traditional transport agencies have been publishing the data of their trans-
portation solutions. Airline companies [139], train operators [143], and city-to-region-
wide bus operators have been compelled to open the data regarding their trans-
port systems to integrate with (de-facto) standards [76]. Beside traditional transport
agencies, new companies entered the transportation market offering functionalities
for mobility such as mapping, travel guidance, multi-modal journey planning and
booking. The latests novelty on the transportation market scene are hailing compa-
nies like Uber [189] and Lyft [115]: “virtual” agencies that offer software function-
alities to enable transport solutions. This scenario characterises the first tier of the
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MaaS Stack where isolated entities, called eMobility operators, provide functionalities
for mobility called eMobility services..
5.2.2 MaaS Stack Tier I | eMobility Operators
Definition 1 (eMobility Service). A software functionality for mobility, provided in a
machine-readable form.
For example, an eMobility service could give access to airline/train/bus sched-
ules in machine-readable formats [76, 77, 35]. Support for machine-readable formats
is key to enable the dynamic composition of services, so that information can be au-
tomatically processed, enriched, aggregated, etc., and exposed to other services in
the same fashion. Figure 5.3 shows the layered taxonomy of eMobility services in
the MaaS Stack. The mobility-specific services fall into two macro-categories: Infor-
mation and Travel ones; then, there are what we define User services, such as user
identity management, user preferences, payment circuits, etc., which are not specific
to mobility. A listing of the fundamental services in these categories includes the
following.
Information services allow users to access basic data needed for transportation pur-
poses.
Static / Planned data is stable or seldom updated, regarding elements like
maps, infrastructures (e.g., bus stops, parking, rails, docks), and timeta-
bles of transport services.
Real-time data report the status of the system. This ranges from unexpected
infrastructural unavailability to current weather conditions, GPS position
of vehicles, available seats/spots, traffic, delays, strikes, etc..
As depicted in Figure 5.3, Information services can be stacked as well. We
illustrate the concept considering the Static / Planned information stack: the
basic data on vehicles regarding e.g., Routes and Timetables provide a base for
the static Transport Network. This holds also for Geographical Maps with respect
to the transport network.
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User services provide functionalities loosely related to transportation but necessary
to interact with users.
User Identity / Profile Management services allow to authenticate and autho-
rise users, and also include functions to manage their preferences and his-
torical records.
Payment services handle transactions to pay transportation solutions and (pos-
sibly) the access to eMobility services.
Travel services mainly build upon Information ones.
Journey Planning services find journeys, possibly multi-modal, between two
points. They work on static data, possibly integrating real-time one for
dynamic results.
Travel Guidance assist the user with real-time travelling information wrt her
position (e.g., turn-by-turn guidance).
Travel Monitoring services track the position of the user and notify other sub-
scribed applications of check-ins/-outs and other events related to her
movements.
Booking services use Information and Payment services to place a reservation
for the user (e.g., seats, spots, etc.).
Ticketing integrates Booking services to create and deliver transportation tick-
ets (i.e., access tokens) to users.
In the first tier of the MaaS Stack, we consider only single eMobility operators
(i.e., operators that do not use and integrate the services of other operators).
Definition 2 (eMobility Operator). An entity that owns, administrates, and exposes eMo-
bility services.
Intuitively, an eMobility operator is any entity (company, association, etc.) that
publishes and orchestrates a set of eMobility services directly administrated by itself.
An example of tier I eMobility operator is the National Train Operator in Figure 5.1:
it exposes services to buy tickets online and to publish timetables and the real-time
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position of vehicles in machine-readable standards. Our definition of eMobility op-
erators comprises also providers of services not directly linked to transportation so-
lutions, for example weather forecasts: indeed, they provide an important informa-
tion on mobility and can enter the MaaS market as well.
5.2.3 MaaS Stack Tier II | Business Intelligence
The second tier of the MaaS Stack still focuses on single eMobility operators but
it enriches the taxonomy of eMobility services with the category of Business Intelli-
gence [37]. This category of services is separated from first-tier ones for two reasons:
first they are not meant for users but rather for eMobility operators, and second, they
span over all first-tier services by monitoring and analysing their usages. The aim of
Business Intelligence services is to provide insight on the performances of eMobility
services.
In Figure 5.1, an example of second-tier Business Intelligence service is the eT-
icketing Analysis Service. The service can access the data of the eTicketing System
and, e.g., can suggest new pricing policies to the National Train Operator as well as
reporting rarely used routes that could be merged/discarded. More generally, other
examples of Business Intelligence services comprise reporting on the usage of the
published eMobility services, analysis of the quality of transit systems (e.g., relat-
ing the discrepancies between scheduled trips and real-time delays), monitoring the
profitability, sustainability, and reliability of the provided services and determining
trends and making predictions on future usage, for capacity planning and policy
definition.
5.2.4 MaaS Stack Tier III | MaaS Operators
As mentioned in section 5, the market of eMobilty operators is a very scattered one.
The concept of Mobility as a Service originates from the economic opportunity of
bridging the gaps between operators, both cutting down overhead for users and
enabling synergistic strategies among transport providers. For the creation and suc-
cess of such a MaaS market, it is imperative that eMobility operators can trade and
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use said services on-demand. Such high degree of flexibility (and trust) is typical of
federations [160, 25].
Definition 3 (MaaS Operator). An eMobility operator
federated with other eMobility operators. A MaaS operator provides to its users eMobility
and transit services of other operators as its own. The usage of such foreign services under-
goes formal business policies.
In the context of MaaS, when eMobility operators federate, they accept to adopt
common technologies and formal business policies. Such technology standards and
regulations are critical for a marketplace where eMobility and transportation ser-
vices are traded like stocks, i.e., dynamically (not regulated by long-term, static con-
tracts) and on-demand. Federated operators establish business policies to mechanise
the trading of their services. The aim is to let users integrate eMobility services and
transportation solutions of “foreign” operators into their travelling experience. The
principle, already envisioned in [151], resembles that of roaming of GSM phone net-
works [141], where users connect through the services of another phone company
when travelling outside the geographical coverage area of the home network.
Definition 4 (MaaS Roaming). Users of a MaaS operator can transparently use eMobility
and transit services of other, federated operators.
As an example, consider the MaaS Operator in Figure 5.1. Being federated with
the National Train Operator and The City Bus Operator, it can offer multi-modal
journeys that span different means of transportation (rail and road) and have wide-
to-narrow scopes (inter-city and intra-city). For example, the MaaS Operator can
leverage the available business policies so that its users can plan and purchase a trip
(through its journey planner) associated with an eTicket bought from the National
Train Operator which also comprises 5 trips of the City Bus Operator. The synergy
benefits all partners: the MaaS Operator provides (and it is paid for) a comprehen-
sive service to its users; the National Train Operator acquires users and can charge
for the access to its eTicketing system; the City Bus Operator acquires new users that
(probably) would otherwise have taken a taxi due to the overhead of looking for the
right route and where to buy the needed tickets. Our example introduces the last
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fundamental element of the third tier of the MaaS Stack: Clearing services, i.e., eMo-
bility services that account for roaming usages and compensate operators according
to the established business policies. This is of course the glue between the SMAll
architecture and the previous use case scenario described in 4.1), a clearing system
result of a vertical service enabled with the SMAll architecture.
5.3 The SMAll Architecture
5.3.1 A Market of Microservices
Following the lesson of Cloud Computing [26] (and the related SaaS/PaaS/IaaS
stack), we argue that MaaS providers will require tools and infrastructures to harness
the heterogeneous landscape of eMobility operators. We choose microservices [54]
as the enabling technology for an on-demand marketplace after the observation that
operators (e.g., the Bus Operator in Figure 5.1) already have a collection of legacy
software systems that address some specific issues (e.g., the Bus GPS Positioning
and the Timetables services) and that other operators (e.g., the National Train Oper-
ator in Figure 5.1) are willing to pay to access them. In practice, operators would like
to include specific external functionalities (e.g., a bus tracking service) in their own
services rather than use (and pay for) a bundle of unneeded functionalities (e.g., a
real-time planner that includes the mentioned bus tracking capability). Microservice
architectures achieve such degree of granularity.
In chapters 2 we already motivated the choice of microservice philosophy. Mi-
croservice architectures bring fundamental features for on-demand provisioning,
among which: independent development cycles, per-usage resource allocation (lim-
iting the allocation for unneeded bundled functionalities), and freedom to use task-
specific technologies.
As expected, microservices come with some trade-off: loosely-coupled microser-
vices communicate via message passing, which requires proper routing and may
suffer latencies and failures; many requests can overload a service, hence it should
prevent outages by limiting them and/or scaling accordingly; microservices are het-
erogeneous but their data-formats and Application Programming Interfaces (APIs)
should be homogeneous to foster compositionality.
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For these reasons, SMAll strives for standardization of data-formats and APIs.
Moreover, it provides infrastructural tools to cope with most of the aforementioned
issues: orchestration abstractions to streamline the composition of available services
(via the Jolie programming language [98, 137]); data-format conversion functionali-
ties; service registries and dispatchers to both store the definition and address of all
the services deployed on the platform and to route requests to them; business intel-
ligence outlets for auditing and performance indicators on the usage of services.
We now proceed to address the main characteristics of MaaS federated markets,
describing the elements of SMAll that deal with them. In doing so, we follow the
MaaS Stack from the bottom up. We first focus the needs of single eMobility oper-
ators within the first two tiers, broadening our view to MaaS operators in the third
tier.
5.3.2 Tier I and II
Whilst tier I and II are stacked and their respective services differ from a user per-
spective (travellers for the first tier, operators for the second one), at the architectural
level they share the same needs and components. Hence, in this section, we consider
them together.
Concerning these two tiers, we fixed some basic requirements in the design of
SMAll that we deem necessary within a platform for single-tenant microservice de-
ployment:
• sandboxing [75, 157] for development and security;
• scaling both horizontally (i.e., create and remove copies of the same service)
and vertically (i.e., increase and decrease the resources available to a microser-
vice);
• publication and discovery of services and the related Application Program-
ming Interfaces (APIs);
• orchestration of services.
Below, we detail the mentioned requirements and discuss the elements of the
SMAll platform that address them.
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Deployment — Sandboxing and Scaling virtualisation is the standard solution
for cloud-based deployment of services [26]. The administrator of a service creates
an isolated virtual machine, i.e., sandboxed, wrt the others and deploys her service
on it. Then, single virtual machines can be scaled vertically and, by managing the
number of copies of the same machine, horizontally.
However, virtual machines have several shortcomings: they entail important costs
due to the need for dedicated resources, these resources could be wasted in idle cy-
cles, and preparing and deploying full virtual images takes sensible time.
Hence, in SMAll we chose containerisation [127] as suitable solution that balances
costs, time, and ease of development with a flexible and secure deployment. On
these regards, SMAll can integrate techniques to optimise the deployment of mi-
croservices based on a description of the target configuration [66].
Beside deployment, microservices are mainly involved in orchestration, to which
we dedicate the next two paragraphs. In the first, we describe why and how services
should be indexed into a registry for discovery. In the second, we show how to
support the orchestration of discovered services.
Orchestration — Registry and Discovery in cloud-based platforms like SMAll, the
address of a microservice is dynamically determined at the time of the deployment
and can even change during the life-cycle of the microservice (e.g., due to migra-
tions). For this reason, SMAll does not provide the direct address of a deployed
microservice.
Instead, following a pattern called registry-and-discovery — adopted by other cloud
platforms [145, 147, 7, 9, 197] — when a programmer deploys a service in SMAll, she
also registers it, with its description and APIs, into a Registry. As reply, the Registry
returns a unique identifier of the microservice, which works as its reference address.
A registered service becomes visible to (allowed) users through the Discovery
service, i.e., a SMAll helper dedicated to query the Registry to find services that
match the requirements expressed by a user.
Indeed, SMAll supports users and access policies to let the owner of a service define
which member can discover (and interact with) it. This is useful also within the
borders of a single eMobility operator, where different departments deploy services
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FIGURE 5.4: Example workflow of the SMAll Dispatcher.
handling confidential information, to avoid dangerous leakages [29].
Finally, regarding API definition, in SMAll we chose to support RESTful [63] and
Jolie ones. On the one hand, we chose to support RESTful interfaces for compatibil-
ity, given the current adoption of RESTful technologies. On the other hand, we argue
Jolie interfaces to be more flexible than RESTful ones (e.g., they are not constrained
within HTTP verbs). Moreover, Jolie interfaces enjoy desirable features like out-
bound and in-bound checking for compatibility wrt the specified API [136]. Hence,
when present, we preserve Jolie interfaces of microservices and provide tools5 for
the automatic conversion to RESTful ones.
Orchestration — Routing The last feature we consider here is routing of requests
to registered services, which in SMAll is embodied by the Dispatcher service. As
an example of interaction with the Dispatcher, consider Figure 5.4 that depicts the
invocation of the Bus GPS Proxy from the Bus Delays service (Figure 5.1).
In Bus Delays the programmer writes the orchestration code, labelling the invoca-
tions to the Bus GPS Proxy with its identifier BGP — as mentioned, programmers can
5The Jolie REST router: https://github.com/jolie/jester
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obtain microservice identifiers at deployment-time or through the Discovery.
At runtime, each invocation done by the Bus Delays service passes through the Dis-
patcher, which interprets the label assigned to the invocation and redirects it to the
actual deployment address of the Bus GPS Proxy. The Dispatcher handles the rout-
ing of the response back to the invoker.
The Dispatcher also plays a central role in the development of microservices
in SMAll (similar to API Gateways [148, 7]) and supports the advanced features,
like access policies and service level agreements, of the third tier of the MaaS Stack.
These features (rectangles in Figure 5.4) comprise:
• Authentication and Authorisation, forwarding only requests allowed to interact
with the invoked service;
• Service Level Agreements which e.g., regulate the rate of calls per time unit and
certify the respect of availability and responsiveness contracts;
• Support Design Patterns for microservices, like circuit breakers [138], caches,
etc., which normally would require a direct integration within (and modifica-
tion of) the microservices, as done e.g., with Netflix Hystrix [146];
• Logging, which is useful for debugging and security;
• Data and Channel conversion for the seamless integration of heterogeneous ser-
vices, e.g., in Figure 5.4 the request of the Bus Delays service uses HTTP and
JSON while the Bus GPS Proxy uses XML over SOAP.
5.3.3 Tier III
The third tier contains the most advanced features of SMAll, devoted to the creation
of a global MaaS market.
We note that SMAll encompasses two types of federations.
The first one is at the level of eMobility operators, which can trade and access their
services (becoming MaaS operators). These federations are defined dynamic because
i) they exist at runtime, according to the automatic enforcement of the Access Poli-
cies and Service Level Agreements of the invoked service and ii) they live as long as
their related transaction between the parties.
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The second type of federation concerns SMAll instances. Here, the federation is
static, i.e., the owners of SMAll instances define agreements regarding the inter-
communication technologies [93], the security, reliability, and availability of their
link, and the security requirements within their platforms.
With federated SMAll instances, eMobility operators belonging to distinct instances
can trade their services and establish dynamic federations that span different geo-
graphic contexts.
The fundamental components that allow SMAll to form a unique market of eMo-
bility services are the Discovery and the Dispatcher. Indeed, once these two compo-
nents are aware of the presence of other instances of SMAll, they are able to automat-
ically route discovery queries and service invocations towards the other federated
platforms. To do this, both components forward their (respective discovery and in-
vocation) requests towards their equivalent in the targeted platform. The forwarded
request is handled as coming within the targeted platform. This is the context where
the advanced features of the Dispatcher heavily come into play to enforce Access
Control and Service Level Agreements.
Finally, dynamic federations of eMobility operators enable the support for roam-
ing, the hallmark of Mobility as a Service, i.e., that MaaS users can integrate into
their travelling experience the eMobility services and the transportation solutions
of other operators. Clearing services are the last piece that completes the picture
in SMAll, as they compensate usages of transport solutions as well as of eMobility
services, according to the contract agreements.
5.4 Problems: Insider Threats
Statistically, insider threats are one of the most expensive security issues for busi-
ness companies [142]. One prominent reason of these expensive outcomes is that
companies did not foresee all possible malicious insider activities [182]. Indeed, the
problem is not the lack of proper countermeasures as much as the difficulty of iden-
tifying a malicious insider in the first place. Literature abounds with guidelines and
principles aimed at providing general descriptions of the context and the identity
of the insiders [64, 40]. However, experts agree that the strong contextual variance
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of threats [171] makes providing a general yet precise identification of all possible
insiders difficult.
Thus, we deem useful to share the experience we gained in the context of services
for mobility (both at software and physical level). Moreover, our background on the
development of SMAll provides insights on the possible threats deriving from feder-
ated cloud architectures, built for deploying, publishing, and trading services. Fed-
erated clouds have been already analyzed in literature [102, 150, 192], however we
deem important to include the related threats in the frame of the emerging Mobility-
as-a-Service scenario.
In section 5.4.1–5.4.3, we illustrate, for each tier of the MaaS Stack (cf. Fig. 5.2), the
insiders, the related attacks, and the possible countermeasures, as found in the state
of the art and as implemented in SMAll. In Fig. 5.5 we report a table that summarizes
our findings. Agents and threats are classified according to the categories identified
by Casey in [34] and the CERT technical report [177]. We dedicate the last paragraph
of this Section to a brief description of the methodology we followed to recognize
the threats and the respective countermeasures.
Methodology As mentioned, adopting a narrow definition of insider may hinder
the identification of threats specific to particular contexts. Therefore, in our investi-
gation, we prefer to look at insiders from a general point of view [18]:
A trusted entity that is given the power to violate one or more rules in a given
security policy [. . . ] the insider threat occurs when a trusted entity abuses that
power.
This definition hints that an insider is determined by the role played as member
of a system and related to the deployed control rules and the pursuable malicious
goal(s).
In our context, the most classic scenario is one where the insider is within the service
of the victim, e.g., a programmer that manipulates the behavior and the data of a
service.
However, orchestrations spanning many providers, hallmark of the SMAll platform,
lead to subtle yet relevant threats. Consider the case of federated partners. On one
hand, the provider of a service exposes itself to threats posed by members that use
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Tier Agent Agent Type Insider Threat Event Type
Fake Data Injection Sabotage
Service Behavior Manipulation Product Alteration, Sabotage
Unauthorized Guests Competitor, Theft, Activist Man-in-the-middle Attack Misuse
Developers Competitor, Partner, Disgruntled Insider User Impersonation Sabotage, Espionage, Misuse
Service Administrators Partner, Disgruntled Insider, Untrained/Distracted Insider, Supplier Insider Impersonation Sabotage, Espionage, Misuse
Service Managers Partner, Disgruntled Insider, Untrained/Distracted Insider, Supplier Crowdsourcing Attacks Sabotage, Financial Fraud
Agent after privilege 
escalation Activist, Competitor
Data Leakage
- Accidental
- Data Theft
- Resale of Data and Access 
- Business Intelligence Data Theft
IP Theft, Opportunistic Data Theft, Physical Theft, 
Accidental Leak
Data Manipulation, Trustability, Tampering of Data 
Provenance, Data Trustworthiness
Financial Fraud, Product Alteration
Service Behavior Manipulation Financial Fraud, Product Alteration
Composition of Unverified Services and Data Misuse, Sabotage, Espionage, Product Alteration
Denial of Service Sabotage
Service Workflow Manipulation Misuse, Sabotage, Espionage, Product Alteration
MaaS Competitor Nation State, Partner, Supplier 
Helper Service Competitors, Nation State, Partner, Supplier
Data Analysis:
- Pattern Extraction 
- Data Mining 
- Data Exploitation trough data crossing
Accidental Leak, Opportunistic Data Theft 
Espionage, Financial Fraud
1 & 2
User Competitor, Untrained/Distracted Insider, Outward Sympathizer
3
Federated MaaS 
Member Competitors Nation State Partner Supplier
FIGURE 5.5: Summary table relating the tiers of the MaaS Stack to
their concerning insider threats.
its service — security issues span from misuse of information extracted from the
service to over-usages that entail unforeseen costs or outages — on the other hand,
an agent that orchestrates services of other partners is a man-in-the-middle able to
leak private information, counterfeit data or use its vantage point to extract strategic
patterns from partners.
Regarding countermeasures, we structured our analysis of the possible alterna-
tives following the review compiled by Hunker and Probst [92], encompassing the
three approaches: i) Prevention, comprising the definition of strong access control
rules, data management systems (including data masking and data camouflage),
and mechanisms to guarantee data provenance and data trustworthiness; ii) Detec-
tion, that usually goes hand-in-hand with dissuasion mechanisms such as techniques
of data management and service invocation that make abuses extremely expensive
in terms of computing power; iii) Mitigation, that exploits auditing and monitoring
techniques, often based on machine learning, to automatically react to insiders’ ac-
tivities.
5.4.1 MaaS Stack | Tier I
As reported in section 5.2, the first tier of the MaaS Stack focuses on single eMobility
operators and categorizes their services.
In this tier, the ecosystem of services has a flat structure and all members play the
same role of providers, without any interaction between each other. Here, insiders
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can be pinpointed within two types: i) users authorized to interact with services and
ii) managers (also seen as owners) of the services. In the reminder, we call Users
the members of the first type and Managers the members of the second one. The
distinction between the two types is trivial: while Users have limited access to data
and functionalities of a service, Managers can have full or partial control (depending
on the responsibility level) over the life-cycle of the service and its resources. Users
allowed to interact with SMAll services can basically pose two types of threats: i)
perform fake data injection (for crowdsourcing-based services) and ii) sharing the
access to the services or to the respective data.
Users can also exploit vulnerabilities to acquire Manager privileges (configuring an
Insider Impersonation threat). However, we do not include a discussion on these kind
of attacks as they coincide with those described for Managers. Regarding Managers,
their main threats comprise:
• manipulation of the behavior of a service, i.e., the computations done by a
service;
• manipulation of the workflow among services, i.e., the direction and sequence
of information flow among services;
• stealing data, metadata, and performing malicious analyses;
• exposing sensitive information.
Following the first tier of the MaaS Stack, we describe the possible insider attacks
of each category of services.
Information
The category of Information spans from basic services that publish raw data (e.g.,
timetables or the position of vehicles) to higher-level services that elaborate raw
data to extract new information (e.g., the expected delay of buses whose calculation
requires the position of a vehicle and its scheduled plan). As already mentioned,
the Information category is the point of conjunction between high-level services for
MaaS — and, by extension, MaaS markets — and sensing devices in Cloud of Things.
Indeed, most of the real-time data used by this services is generated by embedded,
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portable or even wearable [62] devices/sensors. Since in this work we separate the
analysis on services and on CoTs, here we consider only threats at the level of ser-
vices, dedicating section 5.5.1 to the analysis of threats on CoTs.
Notably, since Information services orchestrate other services to calculate and
publish these refined data, they are subject to Service Workflow Manipulation and
Composition of Unverified Services and Data threats. We omit to present these issues
in this Section and defer the discussion to section 5.4.1.
Data Leakage Data leakage is the accidental distribution of private or sensitive
data to unauthorized entities [174, 33]. In SMAll, both Users and Managers can cause
data leakage. Users can share data to other, non-authorized Users. Similarly, Users
can also share their access to services, which could lead to data leakage but also
to other type of threats like User Impersonation. As expected, data leakage becomes
even more serious when considered for Managers that can share or steal sources
unreachable by users.
Countermeasures Data leakage poses a serious issue in open networks where the
transition of data is not regulated nor monitored in their path. In these regards,
SMAll holds a privileged position. In fact, all communications among the services
in the platform happen through the Dispatcher (cf. Fig 5.1), which can log the quality
and quantity of information required by all Users. Obviously, this guarantee ceases
when data exits the platform. The same tracing system applies also to Managers.
Crowdsourcing Attacks Users can perform insider attacks on crowdsourcing ser-
vices. These services handle data streamed from sensors and devices or through
direct signaling of the users. An example is a crowdsourcing service where users
can report architectural limits for people with disabilities [130]. In this case, insiders
can feed the service with fabricated data to alter the normal behavior of services,
e.g., by directing users through specific pathways.
Countermeasures For the sake of completeness and clarity, let us start from the
literature regarding “classic” threat scenarios. Cho et al. [39] examined how insider
attacks can exploit security holes in a trusted network of sensor nodes. This work
is of interest for our platform because it shows how even trust-based approaches, in
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architectures that have to unify many nodes, are not guaranteed to prevent attacks.
In [69], the authors described how access control policies for a database manage-
ment system can be exploited by insiders when the control restrictions to be enforced
may come from different authorities. Shatnawi et al. [175] made a similar analysis
but based on the detection of malicious usage of a data source, which is equivalent
to our case of a malicious influence of data source services exposed by the SMAll
platform.
An interesting work that can be applied to our architecture is [181]. Here the au-
thors implemented a pool of honeypots to catch insiders. A honeypot is an informa-
tion system resource whose value lies in unauthorized or illicit use of that resource.
The high flexibility of honeypots — able to play a huge variety of SMAll-compliant
services — is essential to make insiders expose themselves. Another useful method
that can be easily built within SMAll is a reporting system for crowdsensing and
crowdsourced data, implemented in [131]. The reporting system is based on the
mapping of what the authors called Point of Interest (POI). Each POI and its related
data can be added to the system by means of one or more reports. Reports are clas-
sified in three different source classes, accordingly to the reputation of the user that
collects the data.
Service Behavior and Data Manipulation As expected, insider threats posed by
Managers constitute a more complex scenario.
This type of insiders can access and modify the raw data of services as well as ma-
nipulating their logic to present altered results.
Notably, since in our context the physical world mixes with that of software services,
we extend the role of Managers not only to the developers that can modify the actual
code of the service but also to conductors and other operators: agents that can access
and manipulate the physical devices that feed the services.
The manipulation of these services can have many purposes from the point of
view of an insider. For example, during the development of SMAll we interacted
with many industrial partners, among which there were some public transportation
companies that provided real-time positioning of their vehicles. However, some of
these companies did not report the actual position of buses and instead published
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fake positions to mirror the exact planned schedule. In another case the service
worked intermittently. In the first case, the company provided fake data to protect
itself against possible penalties due to delays, in the second case the positioning
service went down for certain rides due to drivers that disabled the in-vehicle posi-
tioning devices either for fraudulent purposes (to avoid being scrutinized) or even
for shallow reasons such as to disable annoying automatic voice announcements.
Countermeasures Interesting works tackle the issue of how to predict insiders ac-
tivities. Machine learning techniques have proven to be very effective in the detec-
tion of attacks by identifying anomalies in network traffic [119]. Furthermore, ma-
chine learning algorithms have been successfully used to detect past and ongoing
attacks based on analyses of changes on the writing style of the users [86].
Althebyan [5] implemented a prediction model based on graph theory approaches,
to push alert once a detection risk mechanism finds that users are performing actions
that might lead to compromise the system services.
Studies also exist aimed at discovering malicious command execution. Among
the most relevant works, Kamra et al. [101] and Mathew et al. [123] focus on the anal-
ysis of anomalous commands executed on databases. In particular, they proposed
a syntax analysis system to detect anomalous queries; the former analyzed the sub-
mitted SQL queries, while the latter focused on data retrieved from queries. Doss
and Tejay [53] conducted a similar investigation as a field study within an enterprise,
where analysts were monitored while performing their jobs. Again, these results can
be readily applied in our architecture, especially considering that tier I services will
in any case be monitored by probes needed to build Business Intelligence services of
the second tier.
In principle, the SMAll service deployment interface can verify the correctness of
an application before accepting it. In practice, this operation is very hard to perform.
One indicator of correctness is the compliance to a template of acceptable interfaces
for the kind of service the application provides. However, it is very difficult to define
templates strict enough to allow sensible compliance checks, but general enough to
avoid hindering the deployment of legitimate services.
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Another important detection strategy that we considered is to implement a mech-
anism that could guarantee, in every moment, a reproducibility of the results of a
service. With provenance certifications of raw data and their propagation to results,
it is possible to implement a reference monitor to verify compliance between results
and expected values. In case of conflicts between the declared results and the actual
ones, SMAll could discover what has been tampered with: the source data, or the
service logic. This detection can also feed a data trustworthiness rating system.
Finally, another way to check correctness is to look at the actual behavior of the
application, as it is common in anti-malware checks. These techniques are far from
infallible, and their scope falls much shorter than what is required in our setting.
Indeed, in this context a malicious behavior can be a subtle deviation from the cor-
rect calculation [140], which is far more difficult than the detection of traditional
malicious behaviors (e.g., damaging or self-replicating ones). Promising techniques,
which can benefit from the execution of all the services on the SMAll platform, are
those based on the aggregation of multi-domain information [57, 6].
Travel
Services in the Travel category orchestrate Information ones to provide highly coor-
dinated functionalities to users. Since the services in this category heavily rely on
composition to provide their functionalities, their main concerns regard their work-
flow.
Service Workflow Manipulation Managers can modify the expected flow of in-
formation among services for many purposes. As an example, consider the Man-
ager of a service called Bus ETA that predicts bus arrivals. In its calculations, Bus
ETA uses three source-services, respectively for traffic, GPS positioning, and weather
forecasts. Although the Manager preserves the logic (i.e., the behavior) of the Bus
ETA service, by simply changing the workflow, i.e., the bindings of the Bus ETA to
the other services, she can make (some) of the sources unreachable, either completely
disabling the Bus ETA service or modifying the resulting output due to missing data.
Countermeasures SMAll already provide tools to contrast service workflow ma-
nipulations through the helper services Dispatcher and Business Policies (Fig 5.1).
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Indeed, when Managers deploy their services in SMAll, they also define the related
access rules (stored and retrieved in the Business Policies service). Then, all work-
flow compositions pass through the Dispatcher service that logs them and enforces
the established access policies. In this way, unexpected workflows are detected,
logged, and (depending on the access rules) forbidden. The monitoring capabil-
ities of the Dispatcher can also be enhanced with features like the one presented
in [170], which predicates the provision of enclaves (in our case, provided as a ser-
vice) to reduce the surface area of data exfiltration of workflows; in [207, 208], where
anomalous traffic is detected by mapping user input activities (e.g., their requests)
to their generated chain of events on the interested microservices, or more in general
by finding causal relationship among network events in large datasets; and in [60],
where the Dispatcher can use machine learning engines, similar to the ones used in
dynamic malware analysis, to detect malicious workflows. Finally, based on service
specifications, we can create workflow graphs for strategic mitigation [190].
Another promising approach comes from the field of Choreographic Program-
ming [135]. The use of choreographies to implement workflows among services is
relatively new [72]. We deem choreographies an effective prevention tool that lets
partners agree on a formal definition of their workflows, which can be later com-
piled into their respective, compliant services. Moreover, in the dynamic context
of SMAll, tools like [48] can aid partners in updating their agreed workflows even
at runtime (i.e., without stopping their running services). These updates would be
still conditioned to a general agreement and maintain the same guarantees of the
original services.
Mitigation techniques can be also developed following e.g., [74]. The idea would
be to develop a SMAll helper service that monitors workflows and, once an attack
by an insider is discovered, it appropriately redirects the workflow to avoid further
damage.
Composition of Unverified Services and Data In the context of mobility, verified
information is of paramount importance. However, in a service-oriented architec-
ture, the tricky part to deal with is that a service invocation can be seen as a col-
lection of workflows. These workflows can compose many levels of services, each
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processing and modifying the data before its final destination. These services inher-
ently include the logic of the composed services and, by extension, also the possible
manipulations executed by insiders. As an example, consider a journey planner that
uses a real-time traffic report service to avoid traffic jams and roadblocks. Since the
journey planner directly integrates the information from the traffic report service,
manipulating information of the latter alters the solutions of the journey planner,
diverting travelers towards certain pathways. This case presents an interesting nu-
ance: the insider is not a direct Manager of the considered service (i.e., the journey
planner), instead it is the Manager of a composed service (the traffic report) that
twists its contribution to alter the behavior of the planner. In this context also trusta-
bility, provenance, and trustworthiness of data and/or services should be consid-
ered as possible targets of attacks. For example, tampering with data provenance is
a source of attack [178] that in a MaaS scenario can see malicious operators claiming
to publish genuine data of a competitor, actually forging them.
Interfering with the certification of data trustworthiness is another possible vec-
tor. In this case, it is very difficult to block attacks in which, e.g., the creator ad-
vertises a data source of given quality, but then exposes a degraded version to keep
the advantage of more precise/timely information for herself. A related trustwor-
thiness scenario is that of an insider who succeeds in registering a rogue service. For
example, a modified travel planner could deflect routes to favor or damage certain
businesses; a modified delay-checking application could hide or amplify violations
of agreed service levels.
Countermeasures A service must support the provision of different sources of data
along with their associated metadata (e.g., used to verify their provenance). How-
ever, SMAll shall also provide techniques, embodied by helper services, to trans-
form those data into verified information. There are different approaches that pro-
vide a solution to the problem of recognizing the source of a data stream. Literature
agrees [79] that the requirements for a provenance management system are: Verifi-
ability: a provenance system should be able to verify a process in terms of the ac-
tors (or services) involved, their actions, and their relationship with one another;
Accountability: an actor (or service) should be held accountable for its actions in
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a process. Thus, a provenance system should record in a non-repudiable manner
any provenance generated by a service; Reproducibility: a provenance system should
be able to repeat a process and possibly reproduce a process from the provenance
stored; Preservation: a provenance system should have the ability to maintain prove-
nance information for an extended period of time. This is essential for applications
run in an enterprise system; Scalability: given the large amounts of data that an enter-
prise system handles, a provenance system needs to be scalable; Generality: a prove-
nance system should be able to record provenance from a variety of applications;
Customizability: a provenance system should allow users to customize it by setting
metadata such as time, events of recording, and the granularity of provenance.
In these regards, it would be useful to deploy technologies to certify the metadata
related to a data stream and manage its validity during time and re-elaboration [187].
According to works like [180], this problem could be solved only with the creation
of a public-private key system for data stream certification. A good reference is
the system developed in [198], describing a cryptographic provenance verification
approach for ensuring data properties and integrity for single hosts. Specifically, the
authors designed and implemented an efficient cryptographic protocol that enforces
keystroke integrity. This kind of protocols can be integrated as a helper service in
SMAll. However, public-key schemes are known for their significant computational
load, thus existing techniques may not be suitable for high-rate, high-volume data
sources. Moreover, there could be the need for an algorithm for the provenance
of composed data. In some cases, data originated from the composition of raw (or
otherwise lower ranked) sources should be accompanied by suitable metadata for
verifying the provenance of the input values, in a cryptographically strong way. In
the context of SMAll, it could be important and useful to capture and understand
the propagation of data.
The combination of metadata- with key-propagation management can guarantee
a good level of trust in provenance management systems. Works in the direction
of [83] discuss how to support provenance awareness in spatial data infrastructure
and investigates key issues including provenance modeling, capturing, and sharing,
useful to implement key propagation systems.
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Finally, we address trustability, provenance, and trustworthiness of services and/or
data.
Trustability needs to be measured by indicators for data quality and service be-
havior. Values for these indicators come from a variety of considerations on ba-
sic data sources. However, it is challenging to define algorithms for source eval-
uation based on data resulting from services aggregating and orchestrating other
sources [61, 55]. Ascertaining provenance means ensuring that the source of data
is verifiable, i.e., that it corresponds to the one declared in the process of creation.
Trustworthiness is intended as the possibility to ascertain the correctness of the in-
formation provided by a data source, which is loosely related to provenance [47].
Ideally, but infrequently, data samples can be independently measured by different
users, thus allowing cross-checking and error correction. For original data, i.e., pro-
vided by its creator, the trustworthiness score is usually derived from the reputation
of the creator. Clearly, guaranteeing data quality, provenance and trustworthiness
is not enough, it is necessary to ensure that the computation is correct and that no
useful results are hidden (completeness).
User
The last category of services of tier I is not specific to mobility but it contains essen-
tial functionalities for the other two categories. The most representative case is that
of User Profiling and Management. User profiling is not required to create services
for mobility, but it has become essential to ensure usability, to provide user assis-
tance, and to even anticipate and plan for the next movements of the user (cf. Google
Now6).
Data theft Here, the most obvious threat regards the possibility of stealing infor-
mation derived from the profile dataset, such as preferences, recordings of move-
ments, orders and payments.
Countermeasures In our setting, a possible approach is to empower the user with
control over its profile and the related access policies [8].
6https://www.google.com/search/about/learn-more/now/
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5.4.2 MaaS Stack | Tier II
Business Intelligence
SMAll second tier of the MaaS Stack adds a new category next to the ones of the first
tier: Business Intelligence, i.e., services exclusively dedicated to provide insight on
the usage and performances of services of the first tier.
This services can implement any kind of data mining algorithm useful for moni-
toring the profitability, sustainability, and reliability of the provided services, as well
as for determining trends and making predictions on future usage, for capacity plan-
ning and policy definition. Most of this algorithm and services do not usually works
on the physical devices but they are part of a Cloud Architecture.
Business Intelligence Data SMAll Business Intelligence analyses are important
source of sensitive information for insiders (also in this case Managers with privi-
leged access) that could expose relevant data to third parties. Indeed, without Busi-
ness Intelligence services it would be very difficult or even impossible for insiders
to obtain such data, that otherwise would require the access to massive amounts of
private information over long periods.
Managers of Business Intelligence services can apply targeted analyses to infer
reserved information, such as policies and business strategies of their company. An
example of this type of attack is what we simulated in [30], where by just analyzing
the database of validated tickets of a public transport company of the urban area of
Bologna, we were able to reconstruct the distribution of the various types of tickets
in the different zones of the city.
Countermeasures SMAll serves the purpose of mediating the access to relevant
data for Business Intelligence. Every operator wishing to obtain statistics or perfor-
mance indicators about its own services can freely create instances of the platform-
approved analytics services.
Regarding mitigation, the most effective way to hinder the possibility to misuse
Business Intelligence services is to properly sanitize the datasets and to control the
workflow of this information. SMAllse techniques [133] aim to prevent insiders from
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correlating Business Intelligence services with external data sources to derive hidden
patterns or de-anonymize sensitive information.
5.4.3 MaaS Stack | Tier III
The third tier of the MaaS Stack is that of MaaS operators, i.e., eMobility operators
that use services of other companies, traded within a federated market. In our case,
SMAll gives support to such a market but the creation of dynamic federations of
MaaS operators rises specific threats within SMAll (and MaaS markets in general).
In this scenario the main issues to consider are:
• Data service management to avoid manipulation, impersonation, and sensitive
pattern discovery (Prevention and Detection);
• Service workflow management to monitor invocation trends of services (Miti-
gation and Detection);
• Service quality and trustability management to verify the correctness of the
service results (Prevention and Detection).
Indeed, the PaaS layer in SMAll differs from most PaaS solutions. Tradition-
ally PaaS provides offer execution environments that isolate tenants. On the con-
trary, SMAll is built to ease the publication, integration, and orchestration of services
owned by different operators.
A simple example to clarify this characteristic is a one-stop ticketing application
that orchestrates:
• a dynamic planner service providing routing options;
• a user profile manager to sort them according to user preferences;
• a real-time availability seat reservation service;
• a set of services for payment.
The hierarchy of the ticketing service spans many layers, e.g., it integrates the dy-
namic planner that, in turns, orchestrates many services for static (mapping, timeta-
bles) and real-time data (delays, planned extraordinary events, disruptions). The
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composition of services forms a tree of dependencies that reaches the level of raw-
data information services, possibly branching within the domains of different com-
panies.
Since SMAll aims at supporting this kind of interoperability, we argue that it
shall also assume responsibility for the trustworthiness and reliability of the services;
this is unusual for traditional PaaS [118]. Moreover, access control policies can be
heterogeneous, exchanged data can have different sensitivity levels, and the agents
can be competing operators.
Clearly, the main insider threat for this scenario comes from the service providers
themselves, the MaaS operators. The malicious goals can be of various kinds, span-
ning from the de-legitimization of services of competing operators, to the theft of
stored information such as policies or business strategies, to insiders that apply min-
ing techniques to infer these information using the data available from their vantage
point.
We now proceed by focusing our analysis on the relevant insider threats within
the categories of the third tier of the MaaS Stack.
Roaming and Clearing
SMAll aims at providing interoperability between different operators. In this con-
text, interoperability means that it is possible to implement ticketing systems which
seamlessly work on different operators across their zones of influence. As men-
tioned in § 5.2, this concept (and the category of services that supports it) takes the
name of Roaming. Usually, to support at a business level the roaming for users
among operators, business agreements should be put into place to implement a
Clearing system for the redistribution of profits between transport operators. In this
Section, we consider threats as directed to the Clearing category since it comprises
also the threats to the Roaming one.
Pattern Extraction As analyzed in [30], the need for Clearing services is satisfied
through a centralized (federation-wise) system able to collect all the different data
sources from different operators and to perform economic evaluations. A central-
ized clearing system scenario is typically based on a central database that collects
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all the ticket validation data from every public transport operator. This database is
used both to perform economic evaluations to redistribute profits and to store a per-
manent proof of the validity of this evaluation. The clearing system must fulfill an
effective trade-off between public verifiability of the correctness of its operation and
protection of sensitive data provided by operators. As the last cited work shows,
an insider can perform data mining analysis and pattern discovery on the tickets
datasets in order to retrieve sensitive information about business strategies and per-
form unfair competition.
Countermeasures To counteract Pattern Extraction, it is possible to deploy sanitiza-
tion techniques [134] able to mask the data enough to deny the possibility to perform
pattern analysis. These sanitization techniques balance the needs of masking sensi-
tive data and keeping enough properties and information to perform the economic
evaluations. In order to do what we described, we could assemble an anonymization
system, that combines masking techniques for the raw dataset (once deployed in the
centralized database clearing system) and a differential privacy engine able to intro-
duce a certain amount of noise and prevent exploit techniques as cross-combining
data with external ones.
Access Control and Service Level Agreement
Service Level Agreement (SLA) and Access Control (AC) services in SMAll are meant
to throttle the invocation of tier I services provided by an operator on the basis of
commercial agreements with other operators. It is possible to see SLA as a contract
ruling the quantity or rate of invocation of each service, and AC as a contract ruling
the quality or the set of provided data or services. Obviously, malicious insiders may
try to circumvent these limitations.
Countermeasures When a SLA or an AC policy is in place, all service invocations
must be tracked (or even proxied) by an infrastructural service provided by SMAll.
This makes evading enforcement difficult. The most common vulnerability in this
context is not tied to policy enforcement, however, but rather to policy specification.
To this end, SMAll could restrict acceptable policies to those drafted with an inter-
nal helper service, following a standard framework, and formally verifying their
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soundness before applying them. Access control models and formal policy specifi-
cation languages have been around for some time [167, 49], and they have evolved
into sophisticated, standardized models like ABAC [91, 166]. Inadequate (but con-
sistent) policy definitions due to poor understanding of the federation interactions
or to carelessness cannot be tackled at this level; logging and auditing facilities in-
tegrated in SMAll provide valuable feedback at run-time about the effectiveness of
installed policies.
Business Intelligence
Similarly to tier II, in tier III we have a category of services dedicated to business
intelligence. The difference with respect to the services of the second tier is that
here the analyses span data belonging to a multitude of operators. Indeed, as it
happens for clearing services, the business intelligence services of the third tier relate
to the management of data, statistics, and administration of services shared among
operators. The availability of such aggregated data can give free access to companies
(seen as federated insiders) to data and analyses of competitors. Referring again the
case of the dynamic route planner as a running example, the service can use real-
time data of different companies to take into account the average delays of transport
vehicles in the calculation of its solutions. The averaged delays are the result of a
business intelligence service that collects all the delays of a route within a specific
area that involves several operators and calculates the delays. Finally, the recorded
delays are collected into a shared dataset accessible by all the participants.
In this example, an insider can use the collected dataset to find out where the
competitors operate with bigger delays and profit from this information by exposing
their faults to the regional administration. Insiders can also expose cartels where
operators systematically provide a bad service during rush hours to favor a specific
company (e.g., because they hold some economic interest in it). Finally, the insiders
can also find out if an operator hides delays making analysis on the correspondent
road conditions (e.g., showing that buses could not sustain certain speeds since their
routes were jammed).
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Countermeasures All the countermeasures for this kind of attacks are based on a
trade-off between the amount of sensitive data preserved and utility of the queries.
Different anonymization and sanitization techniques have been proposed for com-
plex datasets, but since in SMAll Business Intelligence services share the results of
queries, we need to introduce a measure that indicates the maximum amount of
anonymized information such that the queries still work.
Different works proposed metrics for the evaluation of the amount of privacy
preserved in specific dataset. A measure introduced in [144] defined an evaluation
metric about the presence of pattern in a dataset called δ-presence. We can use this
metric to evaluate the presence of a specific patterns in the shared dataset. Another
interesting work in this direction is [85] which operates by complementing existing
techniques with post randomization methods.
5.5 Use Case
5.5.1 Cloud of Things for MaaS
After our general analysis of insider threats in MaaS, we concentrate on Cloud of
Things (CoT): one of the main enabling technologies for MaaS. We mentioned the
role of Cloud Platforms in MaaS and the threats linked to their ubiquity and contin-
uous connectivity in section 5. Recognizing that a solution at the low level of CoTs
could positively impact the security of MaaS services, we deepen here our analysis
on insider threats of CoTs, in the context of MaaS.
In general, the Internet of Things [10, 80] and the system of networks of IoT de-
vices that constitutes the, so called, Cloud of Things [12, 87], relies on the idea of a
world-wide network of interconnected entities. Concretely, these entities are het-
erogeneous elements interacting over disparate systems of networks: the definition
extends to comprise human beings and computers as well as general-purpose en-
vironmental sensors (light, humidity, temperature, sound) to specific devices like
road traffic monitors or GPS trackers. Making all these entities interact with each
other had and is having sensible, successful applications in multiple domains like
automotive, health-care, logistics, environmental monitoring, and many others.
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CoTs play an important role in enabling many of the modern features of MaaS
services, indeed, entities within the context of CoT share three common denomina-
tors [161]. They are:
• locatable at multiple layers, spanning from their position within an intercon-
nected network to their actual geographical location;
• addressable in such a way that they accept connections from other entities;
• readable other entities can query them to obtain some information.
If on the one hand these properties constitute the promising characteristic of CoT,
on the other hand they make CoT-based networks open to many kinds of malicious
attacks conducted by a plethora of possible adversaries.
Cloud of Things and MaaS: Insider Threats
Considering the categories of threats analyzed in section 5.4, we summarize a brief
account of the possible attacks in the context of CoT linked to insider activities:
• Data Leakage entities can accidentally release private or sensitive data to unau-
thorized entities. Malevolent attackers could also gain information from “al-
ternative” usage of sensors, e.g., by employing temperature, light or audio
sensors to check the presence of people;
• Crowdsourcing Attacks and Data Manipulation where entities that publish infor-
mation feed fabricated data to change the behavior of the services that rely on
them;
• Device Misbehavior insiders can exploit weaknesses in the protocol of interac-
tion of entities, e.g., sensors and actuators, to cause malfunctions and hardware
failure.
Given the threats above, we investigated whether the networking architecture of
CoT entities and its working protocols could mitigate and counteract some of the
vulnerabilities analyzed in Section 5.4.
The idea has already been speculated in literature, for example, in [161] the au-
thors dissect the issue as driven by the two principles of location of intelligence and
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degree of collaboration. The first indicates where the intelligence resides in the net-
work, i.e., if edges of the network provide services rather than simple data. The
second regards the degree of interconnections among heterogeneous entities, i.e., if
they are mainly partitioned based on their nature (sensors for probing, servers for
collection and manipulation of data, etc.) or if they interact on a peer-to-peer basis.
Combined, these two factors characterize the architecture of the network in-
terconnecting the considered entities. Mainstream solutions follow a centralizing
approach, leaning towards "simple" entities that mainly collect information at the
edges of the network and centralized, possibly hierarchical, hubs that aggregate,
manipulate, and redistribute available data.
At the other end of the spectrum, there are decentralized systems that leave some
freedom at the edges of the network, allowing entities to take some decisions. En-
tities can also constitute partitions with some emerging intelligence (e.g., regarding
probing times, correction of sensing, etc.) without a direct control and sharing no
information with a central, high-level entity.
From an insider threat standpoint, we argue that the centralizing approach con-
stitutes the most dangerous configuration. Indeed, following such an approach, en-
tities at the edge of the network are passive elements. They are open to any kind
of query. Malicious ones could be used to infer private information and even cause
malfunctions on the devices, e.g., by consuming their batteries or causing hardware
failures due to overuse. Moreover, the approach is prone to the well-known issue
called “central point of failure” where users of the network must connect to the cen-
tral hubs, which in turn could be compromised to cause denials of service as well as
to reveal sensible information of all users.
On such observation, we investigated networks characterized by a weakened
degree of centralization and an increased collaboration among the entities. In such
architectures, entities at the edges can process local information and provide it to
both central hubs as well as to other peers. These decentralized networks enjoy a
stronger degree of security as nodes can refuse to collaborate in requests that are
deemed dangerous or deviate from established, secure protocols of interaction. In
addition, if proper dynamic reconfiguration techniques are applied, even in case of
malfunctioning central hubs, the local services remain accessible.
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5.5.2 Federated Platooning
Generally platooning comprises a number of vehicles equipped with state-of-the-art
driving support systems one that closely following and collaborate each other. This
forms a platoon driven by smart technology, and mutually communicating. Vehi-
cle platooning and especially truck platooning is innovative and full of promise and
potential for the transport sector.
There are many ways to do platooning. One possibility is to instrument the vehicles
with new and powerful hardware that work as a structure to implement the vehicle
collaboration. This solution as several limits; hardware cost, upgrading cost and the
main one difficulties on the automatic collaboration between different platooning
platform which have to share the same standards and models.
Softwarize this process without the addition of new hardware overcome this limits
but is not easy to do. As we pointed out previously the collaboration between pla-
tooning system of different region can exploit the power of platooning but there is a
need of central authority in charge to enable and validate a federation of platform.
A federated platform of platooning system can improve traffic safety. Platooning is
a cost-saver, fuel consumption saver which means less CO2 emissions. And, lastly,
platooning efficiently boosts traffic flows thereby reducing tail-backs. Meanwhile
the short distance between vehicles means less space taken up on the road. At the
same time the impact platooning goes far beyond the transport sector. Automated
driving and smart mobility also offer realistic chances to optimise the labour market,
logistics and industry.
Enabling Platooning
We argue that an enabling architecture for such platform must be mobility service
enabler platform, and we argue that our proposed, developed platform SMAll can
support the creation of a federation-based service and markets where operators
can publish, automatically retrieve, and orchestrate functionalities for mobility, pro-
vided by different operators.
The platform builds on the concept of Federated Cloud Computing and maintains
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FIGURE 5.6: Example of platoon formation over federated SMAll in-
stances.
an open approach with respect to the possible members of the federation, which cor-
respond to any player that trades services and information linked to mobility.
To better illustrate our proposition, we report in Figure 5.6 a schematic represen-
tation of possible scenarios of a Federated Platooning with SMAll Architecture and
proceed to comment them. In the figure we consider three SMAll instances, covering
different geographical areas. We mark each SMAll instance with a colour, (orange
for SMAll1, green for SMAll2, and blue for SMAll3) where SMAll1 and SMAll2
coverages partially overlap, while the pertinence area of SMAll3 is distant from the
other two (and not represented in the figure). To simplify, in the figure we assumed
a 1:1 correspondence between each SMAll instance and a platooning operator that
belongs to that instance (in reality, many operators can belong to the same SMAll
instance).
Let us first concentrate on the convoy pointed by label A©: the simplest case of a
platooning service, which captures the basic occurrence in the literature where a
98 Chapter 5. SMAll: A Global Federated Market for MaaS Operators
dedicated infrastructure or in-vehicle devices are coordinated by a centralised au-
thority. Indeed, the scenario pictured by A© makes two assumptions: i) that users
of the convoy belong to the same operator and ii) that they travel in the pertinence
area of that operator (which corresponds to the pertinence area of the related SMAll
instance).
The scenario pointed by label B© removes the two assumptions of A©: here ve-
hicles in the convoy are users of different operators and some of these (marked in
orange) are outside of the pertinence area of their operator. In this case, the two op-
erators in SMAll1 and SMAll2 coordinated the formation of a mixed convoy. In B©,
the business policies for service usage negotiation, defined by each operator, medi-
ate between possibly conflicting formation-control logics deployed by each operator.
To better understand this concept, let us suppose that the two operators, in SMAll1
and SMAll2, consider in their respective platoon formation algorithms the two con-
straints of cruise speed and fuel consumption. For example, the operator in SMAll1
could offer to its users solutions that maximise cruise speed while the one in SMAll2
favours fuel savings. Thanks to mechanised composition plans, defined as business
policies in SMAll, the two operators can reach a dynamic distributed consensus over
a mediated solution that satisfies the threshold parameters of their convoy formation
algorithms.
To draw a parallel, this is similar to the negotiations conducted among mobile phone
operators to allow their users to roam within their networks, without having to stip-
ulate a specific contract with each operator. Here, the difference is that such a ne-
gotiation is dynamic, so that users of each operator can choose whether to accept or
not the platooning plan negotiated by the two operators.
Moreover, while platoon formation essentially relies on a static plan where ve-
hicles join and leave a formation at pre-determined times, the mechanised federa-
tion of SMAll instances allow for a higher degree of flexibility: platooning users can
decide to switch between different convoys while travelling, as exemplified by the
vehicle leaving the column in B© to join the convoy in C©. In this final scenario, the
column pointed by label C©, composed of the two users of the operator in SMAll3,
is outside of the pertinence area of their home SMAll instance. Also in this case,
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although the column is composed only of vehicles of the same operator, the platoon-
ing plan results from a negotiation between the two operator respectively in SMAll3
and SMAll1, where the latter manages platoon formation in its area of pertinence.
Finally, thanks to the collaboration between all operators, the three vehicles 1©, 2©,
and 3© can dynamically join the pre-formed convoy in C©.
In such a landscape, thanks to clearing services, given a travel plan, users can
directly evaluate the actual gains (possibly expressed directly as monetary trans-
actions) of many configurations, e.g., whether to join the tail of a formation or be-
come the head of it, or switching between columns. This aspect holds also for users
already in formation, which can agree to let other users join their formation and
share the costs of the convoy. Beside direct user interaction, clearing costs and the
related policies can be also part of the logic of composition among operators to se-
lect/propose optimal plans to their users.
Now that we presented the architectural characteristics of federated platooning op-
erators, we shall analyze the possible security concerns of such a globalised col-
laboration. These span from the illicit acquisition of sensitive data of users to the
deployment of malicious platooning plans, which could easily block the traffic of
extensive areas, as well as threatening the safety of roads in general. To this aim,
in the next section, we expose the main security threats of federated platooning and
propose possible mitigations and countermeasures.
Insider Threats in Platooning
Once the main elements of platooning and federated platoon formation have been
defined, it is possible to analyze the security concerns of such a global collaboration.
These span from the illicit acquisition of sensitive data of users to the deployment of
malicious platooning plans, which could result in a variety of consequences, rang-
ing from inflicting economic losses to competitors, to affecting traffic over extensive
areas, and even to threatening the safety of roads.
A federated environment natively foresees sharing one’s own sensitive informa-
tion, and access to others’ information in a controlled way, for example to know basic
data such as the kind of vehicles on the road, the most common routing choices, but
in some cases also enough details to make tracking a vehicle or a driver possible.
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This kind of sharing is the core enabler for the desired aggregation services. Conse-
quently, security concerns are greatly expanded as the attack surface is enlarged and
diversified with respect to a closed-world model of operation. This kind of threats
are not entirely specific of such platooning federated platforms; they would appear
as an intrinsic aspect of any approach to coordinate services of independent trans-
port agencies. Thus, they are interesting to address because results can be applied to
a wider set of scenarios, and at the same time the analysis can be built upon previous
works. For example, in [30] Callegati et al. we showed how the members of a public
transportation consortium can exploit its clearing system to infer strategic private
information.
In the remainder, we show how these kinds of attacks are relevant in a federated
freight scenario: we describe the main issues introduced by platooning and evaluate
their effects from an economic point of view, showing practical abuse cases, and
highlighting the key vulnerabilities. In 5.6 we present two, layered, composable
technical solutions to mitigate the identified threats.
A discuessed in 5.4 the possible security problems of any platform based on con-
trolled sharing of sensitive data are manifold and include threats such as: compro-
mising the infrastructure where data is stored with the aim of subtracting it, inter-
cepting data in transit by exploiting unsafe communication protocols, injecting fal-
sified or malicious data by exploiting authentication weaknesses, and many others;
these types of attack are not specific to our case study, but instead they are mainly
related to the correct design and implementation of a data management infrastruc-
ture, a topic already widely covered in literature [36, 162, 109, 183], and for this
reason they will not be discussed in this work.
The problem is not only the lack of proper countermeasures but also the diffi-
culty of identifying a malicious insider in the first place [152].
Experts [168] agree that the strong contextual variance of threats makes providing a
general yet precise identification of all possible insiders difficult. Besides the mem-
bers of the federation (here, the platooning operators), federated contexts contain
two additional broad categories of insiders: i) legitimate users, which could lever-
age access to service providers and make a malicious use of information extracted
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from services or cause over-usages that entail unforeseen costs or outages; ii) or-
chestrating agents, which are needed to coordinate any complex architecture, can
act as men-in-the-middle, accessing and/or leaking private information, as well as
counterfeiting, throttling, hijacking or selecting data of legitimate users.
Hereinafter, we follow a categorization between privacy leakage attacks, where
there is a theft of sensitive information, and disruption attacks, where an attacker
interferes with the behavior or the structure of the system. We decided to focus only
on these two categories of concerns for several reasons.
First, we must remember that we are analyzing the concerns from an insider threat
point of view. For this reason, we assume that we already have a certain level of
permission within our infrastructure. This is why all targeted user attacks for ini-
tial access to the infrastructure are not particularly interesting. Second, we do not
take into account attacks on the exploit of the infrastructure for lateral goals, since,
although important, they are not the main cases of insider threat that can be found.
Privacy Leakage All the issues described in this section are a consequence of the
kind of information that the clearing/platooning system needs to share and use.
Examples of relevant categories of data and meta-data include:
• vehicle movements details: origin, destination, middle stops, average time,
average speed, etc.
• details of shipped items: origin, destination, weight, package category, etc.
• route planning and execution constraints: clearing instructions applied to the
current convoy, speed limits, etc.
While needed to enable operators’ participation in platoon formation, the same
information can be used by insiders together with external data sources to compose
a targeted picture of sensitive aspects regarding a victim. The kinds of "retrievable"
information are categorized in the following, based on the insider’s target.
User Attacks A single user’s privacy exploit is an attack that an insider can do in
many ways. There are various effective methods to retrieve information about an
individual driver even if it is not explicitly shared. If any database contains pseudo-
identifiers, for example, the vehicle’s serial number, they can be exploited to obtain
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the existing association between the vehicle id and the driver. For example, in [28]
we demonstrated how to skim the various entries of a database, crossing them with
external data from Open Source and publicly available OSINT tools and proceeding
by exclusion to find the corresponding driver.
The process is described in principle in [31], where in a similar scenario of a data
clearing system for urban public transport it was possible to trace a specific user’s
real identity by performing this kind of correlations. Knowing the precise move-
ments and journeys of a vehicle driver is not only a powerful weapon against the
vehicle driver’s personal privacy; this information can be also used by competing
companies to intercept the rivals’ demand / supply patterns.
Business Policies Attacks For delivering companies, a fundamental competitive
advantage derives from the methods and procedures with which they distribute the
transport vehicles along their shipping routes. Indeed, it is shown [68, 153] that an
efficient allocation of means of transport and drivers can reduce costs and manage-
ment burdens. This information is strictly guarded by any company.
However, as explained above, to feed the necessary data into the clearing system,
individual vehicle data must be (possibly partially) shared to calculate the correct re-
distribution of profits. In turn, illicit access or leakages of these data allow attackers
to trace the distribution rules of the vehicles, as shown by us in [31], where through
sequential analysis with clustering data mining algorithms the authors extracted the
distribution of buses of a transport company present in a clearing system.
Unfair competition Lastly, we consider another type of sensitive information that
an insider is able to retrieve. If information on vehicle routes and items carried is
not properly anonymized, it is possible for insiders to cross them together and with
external sources to interpolate financial details. Knowing which routes are the most
profitable, what prices and which kinds of contracts companies offer on the same
routes, makes it easy for unfair competitors to size contracts and deals [31].
Destructive Attacks The second category of attacks that an insider can launch goes
beyond accessing an unauthorized resource and focuses on deriving advantages
from the disruption of competitor’s services.
5.5. Use Case 103
An insider can try to achieve this result by injecting information in the clearing
/ platooning system. Carefully crafted malicious information may be the cause of a
breakdown of competing services and businesses.
Routing corruption Let us consider a federated platooning system that holds all
the data of the trucks and the shipped items of its members—as mentioned above,
needed to calculate the correct redistribution of the profits and the management of
platooning tasks. An insider might, in this case, inject malicious information aimed
at excluding a specific route, causing denial-of-service targeted at one or more vehi-
cle of a specific company. This exclusion can be achieved in several ways:
• declaring as additional meta-data fake speed limits to make the vehicle (think
of time-guaranteed delivery trucks) late or to make a route plan inaccurately
(in)convenient;
• posting false or incorrectly located traffic updates to force the competitor to
change direction and redirect it to a wrong and / or inconvenient path;
• inserting non-existent routes that will force the vehicle to backtrack and recal-
culate along the way.
Competition starving The previous attack describes a targeted denial-of-service
scenario, in which an insider attempts to block a competitor’s specific service. The
insider might wish, and be able, to do something more subtle. Instead of making a
brutal intervention that causes a detectable disruption of a trip, the attacker could
make a campaign of small, well-distributed manipulations that slowly impoverish
the adversary economically. Such insertions, if successful, have the peculiarity that
they cannot be immediately discovered, emerging only after a thorough and time-
consuming analysis of the dataset. This kind of attack can be executed in several
ways, for example:
• by performing the same kind of injections as described in the previous sce-
nario, but introducing an error so small as to make it unlikely to be noticed as
such, yet causing losses that end up having a disruptive cumulative effect;
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FIGURE 5.7: Phases of the Gossip Network.
• by making actual orders that force the competitor to deploy more vehicles (e.g.,
from a truck fleet) with lower profit margins, and possibly leveraging their
presence to save more fuel from platooning.
5.6 Novel approaches to mitigation
In this section, we propose two layered technical solutions to tackle the data man-
agement issues outlined in the previous section. These two approaches stem from
the observation that, from the point of view of data flow, it is not strictly necessary
to have a centralized architecture to enable an effective exchange of information.
On the other hand, information systems that support federation can be exploited to
enforce correct behaviors of its members.
In the following, we first detail a decentralized overlay network for data safety
and trustworthiness, then we describe the features of a dynamic federation platform,
needed to monitor and interrupt deviant behaviors of federated members.
5.6.1 Overlay Network
A possible alternative to centralized data dispatching is to implement an overlay
network created by the same entities of the federation. In this section we propose a
solution based on a gossip protocol [81, 22], with the intent of mitigating the risk of
sensitive information theft (eliminating the need of a centralized controller), and the
risk of malicious data injection (implementing a trustworthiness source system that
can guarantee the provenance of data).
Before describing the details of our proposed architecture, we provide a brief
account on gossip-based networks, whose principles are at the basis of our overlay
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network. Gossip communication is a style of computer-to-computer communication
protocol inspired by the form of gossip seen in social networks. Modern, large-
scale distributed systems often use gossip protocols to solve problems that might
be difficult to solve in other ways [97], e.g., because the underlying network either
has an inconvenient structure or is extremely large. Computer systems typically
implement this type of protocol with a form of random “peer selection”: with a
given frequency, each machine picks another machine at random and shares any hot
rumors.
In our gossip protocol, users choose to gossip some information anonymously to
a local administrators. Although anonymous, gossips are signed by a ranking grade
owned by each user. In turn, local administrators aggregate (in a weighted man-
ner) the gossips they received regarding the same objects (roads, point of interest,
etc.) and re-gossip that information to users. By aggregating data (received within a
certain time span), administrators mitigate the diffusion of false information in the
network, mediating (or ruling out) contrasting information.
In our gossip protocol, nodes disseminate knowledge of their surroundings — e.g.,
a user is on a route and notifies the status of that road. Moving nodes periodically
probe the network to join the partition to which they geographically belong, follow-
ing a background dissemination approach. This recalls anti-entropy approaches that
focus on providing a system-wide consistent observation as aggregate of many local
responses.
Thanks to the gossip protocol, we also anonymize the identity of users that query
for information. In a traditional network, users would query a central server to
retrieve some information, exposing their query (and themselves, by extension) to
possible privacy attacks. On the contrary, in our setting it is the gossip protocol that
is responsible for spreading information that might become relevant in the future to
users. Hence we accept a trade-off of some overhead information to gain a privacy-
by-design guarantee.
The concepts above are exemplified in Figure 5.7. From left to right, when users
want to join for the first time or move between zones, they query known gateways
to obtain the address of the administrator of the geographical region to which they
currently belong. Administrators act as local zone authorities to route information
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about the same zone, and they can also provide (as gossip) their trustworthy data to
users. In the gossip phase, users disseminate to administrators information regard-
ing their surroundings. In Figure 5.7, U1 and U3 declare to know something about
the route A congestion (e.g., rough road, slow traffic), while U4 has some informa-
tion about a specific incident on Route B (e.g., closed roadways). The remaining
phase regards the inquiry of available data. Users periodically receive aggregate
(and possibly enriched) gossips from the local administrator and query the knowl-
edge they acquired through gossiping to extract relevant information.
Figure 5.8 shows the two planes, over the physical one, that characterize the pro-
posed overlay network. From the physical plane, users join the middle Neighbor-
hood plane where they generate new gossip (in the Figure, the thicker the arrow, the
more trustable the peer). On top, we find the Inquiry plane, where gossip spreads
and where users inquiry their acquired knowledge.
A real world use case application for this overlay network can be a rough-road
check. A service that exposes the real-time information about the road conditions is
typically based on an algorithm that calculates an estimate, considering some previ-
ous information and the GPS position of the vehicle. This information is then saved
on a centralized storage where the delay is calculated. As described above, however,
this methodology introduces security problems on the storage of data and quality of
service, entailed by relying exclusively on the users GPS location, which could pos-
sibly be inaccurate. With the proposed approach, we show how it is possible to
improve the safety and performance of this type of service.
In Figure 5.8, U1 (Inquiry Plane) has been informed of the condition of the route
it is currently following, so it could decide to perform a route deviation. This hap-
pened because it joined its local Neighborhood network, where other users (the blue
and yellow cars that are further ahead on the route) have been gossiping 1© (Neigh-
borhood Plane) about its same route. In its turn, the administrator collected the
gossips, aggregated them, and re-gossiped the information to the users 2©.
Although users U2 and U3 remain anonymous, U1 can rate the quality of the
aggregated information; a metric that can feed the system to assign the degree of
trustability to users, as specified in the previous paragraph7. Besides security, the
7Assignment of rankings to users can be spread back through gossip.
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system enjoys a finer grade of precision on the reporting of the information as the
machine-generated data from the administrator is integrated with user-generated,
close-to-the-source information.
5.6.2 Automatic Business Policies and Contracts Enforcement
In 5.5.2 we detailed how the platooning federation relies on the collaboration be-
tween operators, and how this gives the opportunity to malicious agents to adopt
damaging behaviors. To prevent this, we want to introduce a mechanism to enforce
the respect of the agreed behavior in the federation.
This is a common problem in all kinds of Service Oriented Architectures (SOA),
as explicitly addressed in OASIS’s SOA Reference Model [117]. According to OA-
SIS definitions, policies define constraints for single services, and our approach is
to let each provider and each consumer of services deal with data-related policies
without forcing a centralization which could become the most valuable target for
attacks. Contracts, on the other hand, "represent an agreement between two or more
participants [...] a service contract is a measurable assertion that governs the require-
ments and expectations of two or more parties. Unlike policy enforcement, which is
usually the responsibility of the policy owner, contract enforcement may involve re-
solving disputes between the parties to the contract. The resolution of such disputes
may involve appeals to higher authorities. Like policies, contracts may be expressed
in a form that permits automated interpretation."
Our proposal is to let that higher authority be represented by the platform en-
abling the federation. Rather than merely acting as an enabler, the information sys-
tem supporting the federation shall connect each member based on the behavior that
each operator declared and agreed to respect to join the federation. The support en-
compasses automated checking of contracts for compliance to general principles at
design and deploy time, and the enforcement of contract provisions at run time. It is
a part of a more comprehensive strategy for SOA management, as outlined in [169].
This shift moves federation from a static coalition of companies into a federated
market, where operators dynamically partner with each other and trade and use
services of one another on-demand, knowing that the agreed terms of usage will be
respected. As remarked, this last guarantee is enforced by the platform itself, which
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will monitor the flow of requests and responses among the members, detect possible
behaviors that deviate from the declared policy and limit or block the cooperation
with an offending member.
In practice, contract specification is done when the platoon operator wants to
join a federation. In this sense, enabling platforms shall provide respectively:
• a formal model with which to interpret policies and contracts;
• a set of specific requirements to satisfy in order to guarantee a safe environ-
ment;
• a set of policies regarding the use and the misuse of the services exposed;
In this context, business policies can have different purposes. For example, they
can establish rules to mechanize the trading of the services of federated members,
as well as to establish standards used in their interaction, like security and commu-
nication protocols, and define the terms of the quality of service. Automated policy
processing allows automated contract design, to enable dynamic participation to the
federation activities. In turn, contract enforcement at run time ensures all parties that
everyone is held accountable against the designed contracts.
Beside security, we underline how these business policies are particularly important
in the context of platooning operators, where each of them controls a specific, re-
stricted area, while the platooning plan of a convoy usually spans areas controlled
by many operators. With automatized business policies platooning operators can
collaborate in synthesizing a common platooning plan, possibly comprising a mixed
set of their users.
A prototypical example of one such platform has been made in our work in [32],
where we employ machine-processable business policies to federate remote instances
in a federated platform and where transport operators that agree to the same (or
better, to compatible) business policies can partner with each other and trade each
other’s transport services.
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5.7 Conclusions
In this chapter, we presented the concept of Mobility as a Service and how MaaS
operators shall facilitate the dynamic provisioning of multi-modal transportation to
their users. To support such flexibility we developed a federated marketplace of
services called SMAll, aimed at harmonizing data flows and service invocations.
This kind of federated platform is particularly sensitive to insider threats, which
emerge at different layers, targeting both the constituent components provided by
users and operators and the services provided by the platform itself.
The MaaS Stack, our tiered proposed view on the components of MaaS mar-
kets, allowed us to treat in isolation the security issues of each tier. Often, these
issues turn out to be instances of well-known threats in the fields of cloud comput-
ing, service-oriented architectures, supply chain management, and trusted business
partnerships.
In principle, the platform allows to implement context specific versions of the
solutions proposed in the literature regarding the aforementioned fields, as well as
novel solutions inspired by their cross-fertilization. We argue that the central role of
SMAll in mediating every interaction and in collecting their traces makes the plat-
form fit to host solutions to the presented security issues of MaaS markets.
In addition to our general treatment on insider threats related to the context of
MaaS markets, we also show-cased two real world case scenarios; the perspective
of the Cloud of Things, presenting an architecture that constraints the quality and
quantity of data that an insider could obtain from users, also optimizing the routing
of requests to only those users able to answer them; and federated platooning, i.e., a
freight organization system where a consortium of platooning operators collaborate
and coordinate their users to constitute freights.
From our threat analysis, we detailed novel technical solutions to the predom-
inant threats of trustworthiness of data flows and deviant behaviors of federation
members. In particular we showed a over-layered architecture able to manage the
real data flow in a safe way, and a policy enforcement methodology to prevent ma-
licious and fraudulent behaviors and the service platform.
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Chapter 6
TechNETium: a SDN tool to Verify
Security Network Policies
The upcoming 5G promises to the next big thing in networking, making networks
able to adapt to the specific requirements of vertical applications; while the most
common examples consider machine-to-machine applications such as autonomous
driving and massive IoT, social applications will be significantly affected by the im-
proved interactivity and capacity, e.g. enabling immersive real-time gaming and
broadband multimedia communications.
These improvements are achieved through the concept of network slicing, according
to which a single network infrastructure may be partitioned in virtual sub-networks
tailored to the specific requirement of a vertical application, thus achieving an opti-
mal tradeoff between cost (shared) and performance (dedicated).
Network slicing requires a very high level of flexibility of the network infrastruc-
ture, that is supported by emerging technologies such as the intensive exploitation
of Network Function Virtualization (NFV) and the centralized control of the network
forwarding functions, i.e. Software Defined Networking (SDN).
These technologies are a real innovation in networking and allow innovative ap-
proaches to the solution of many problems.
6.0.1 Contributions
This chapter focuses on the network security issues, that are indeed very relevant to
the aforementioned vertical applications. It shows how the formal verification of the
networking forwarding rules, which can be achieved by interacting with the SDN
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network controller may be used to detect possible security issues in the network
data path.
Formal network verification requires a formal representation of the network and a
software architecture working together to efficiently verify the policies and proper-
ties of the network. At the state of the art, there are a few tools and techniques to
achieve this result. An example of a software package which can verify formal poli-
cies is Netplumber; it can verify many different properties, but the complexity of
the underlying methodology (header space analysis) causes important performance
issues. Using techniques such as Atomic Predicates, the fundamental property of
reachability can instead be verified in microseconds, i.e. orders of magnitude more
efficiently than with header space analysis. The main drawback of this approach is
the lack of native expressiveness for policies other than reachability.
The contributions given in this chapter focus on the development of an SDN-based
architecture able to meet and solve this challenges. We called this architecture Tech-
NETium: an original software platform which exploit atomic predicates and binary
decision diagrams to verify network reachability. TechNETium can be used to ex-
press complex policies by compiling high-level rules into compositions of reachabil-
ity verification, enabling the creation of auxiliary policies such as FullReachability
(the verification of bilateral communication between nodes) and ToWayPoint (used
to enforce traffic flows trough a specific intermediate node), which is something new,
to the best of our knowledge in the literature.
This chapter is organized as follows: the principles behind TechNETium are dis-
cussed in section 6.2, and a use case is presented on a SDN network based on the
ONOS controller in section 6.3. Then we presented results showing a significant
performance improvement when compared with other tools in the literature in sec-
tion 6.2.4, in addition to several possible use case example of such architecture in
section 6.4.
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6.1 Context Scenario
6.1.1 SDN and formal verification
FIGURE 6.1: SDN Layer Architecture
The SDN architecture can be seen as a set of different levels (each with specific tasks)
and interfaces for communication between levels. Figure 6.1 shows the 3 levels and
API point representation of a common SDN Architecture:
On the Infrastructure layer we can find the forwarding devices (hardware or soft-
ware) that can be used. There are different standards for this level, but the most com-
mon is certainly OpenFlow, which defines specifications for devices (called Open-
Flow switches) which maintain a set of tables designed to filter packets based on
some fields.
The Southbound API is the interface that allows communication between the
Infrastructure layer and the Control layer. This API are a crucial tool for SDN, al-
though they are strongly linked to underlying elements. It defines a series of event
messages for communication between switches and controller, in addition to gener-
ating statistics generated by the switches and collected by the controller.
The Control layer represents the brain of the network. Here are one or more con-
trollers (or NOS), which provide a global view of the network, essential services, and
common APIs for developers. Thanks to this level, applications do not have to deal
with network implementation details. There are different types of controllers, and
one of the criteria for which they can be distinguished from one another is whether
or not they are distributed.
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A distributed controller can also handle networks a lot articulated. In addition, dis-
tributed controllers must address the issue of data consistency, and often this is guar-
anteed only in relative time long. One of the main advantages of distribution, how-
ever, is certainly the resistance to failures. If a node fails, replication makes it not a
problem.
Centralized controller : a centralized controller has full network control, but
it represents a single point of failure, and may not be able to to set up complex net-
works with a large number of nodes. Often centralized controllers take advantage of
multi-threading for better performance. Another criterion for which two controllers
can be differentiated is the implementation model policy implementation:
Reactive: a reactive controller requires the forwarding devices to consult the
controller whenever a decision is needed. This may turn out to be a problem, above
all if the flows arriving to the network are short (hence of for each new flow the
switch must call the controller), or it would lead to scalability problems in the case
of large networks.
Proactive: a protective approach ensures that policies are implemented at the be-
ginning, without the explicit request of the switches. In addition to communication
through the southbound and northbound APIs, the controllers, in the in case there
are more than one in the network, they communicate with each other through APIs
dedicated, called westbound eastbound APIs.
Northbound API This level allows external applications to use the controller’s
core services to configure, monitor, and manage the network. Unlike the south-
bound interface, there is no common standard, but in general we use REST API, or
languages of specific programming such as Frenetic, and NetCore.
Application layer Here are all the applications that interact with the network.
Thanks to the abstraction provided by the control layer, it is very easy to develop
and implement new ones software in SDN. Applications communicate the controller
with the northbound APIs, and not therefore they need to know the implementation
details of the network.
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6.1.2 Formal Data Plane Verification
In recent years we have seen a huge development of security tools based on formal
verification in various use case scenarios. In particular network verification gained
a lot of interest [15, 89, 2, 132]. It is built around an automated detection of viola-
tions of network reachability invariants on the data plane, possibly while they are
happening in real-time.
A recent work by Beckett et al. [15] proposes a tool called Minesweeper follow-
ing the study of several tools developed by the research community with the goal
of finding network misconfigurations. The studies are classified in two categories:
control plane oriented, i.e., able to discover flawed configurations proactively, and
data plane oriented, i.e., able to discover misconfigurations reactively, by observing
the events happening in the network while traffic is flowing. Both categories have
pros and cons. Proactive approaches are particularly useful to predict potential net-
work misconfigurations that might lead to security issue (e.g., BGP prefix hijacking).
But security breaches in the most general sense are hard to predict a priori, therefore,
the reactive approach is essential to detect unwanted (dynamic) network behavior
occurring as a consequence of malicious activity.
Following the same line, we argue that both proactive and reactive approaches should
be adopted and combined to exploit synergies between them at best. The SDN
paradigms provides the perfect platform to pursue this goal, because in a SDN network what
happens in the data plane is the outcome of what is produced in the control plane but, at the
same time, the control plane has a view of what is happening in the data plane.
6.1.3 SDN and formal verification
The spread of the SDN has sparked a debate about the security of software defined
solutions. Here we will not address the whole of this large subject, concentrating
our attention on some issues regarding the correctness of topology and routing.
Studies like [3, 108] have analyzed the attack surface highlighting the vulnerabilities
and security requirements of the architecture. In [3] it is suggested the combined
adoption of proactive and reactive approaches, however works like [126] emphasize
the importance of reactive solutions for verification of invariants in the data plane:
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the problem consists in checking if certain security policies (policy) are respected
starting from the Forwarding Information Base, that is from the rules of forwarding and
from the topology of the network.
This is a complex problem, since it requires analysing the behavior of all possible
packet headers. The header space, as it is called in [104], can be very large (the IP
header being at least 160 bit long), therefore, since the union and intersection of
packets are computationally expensive operations (complexity (O (2n)) in the worst
case, where n is the number of bits in the header [201]), verification of properties in
a network with thousands of devices can take a very long time.
To improve performance, Yang and Lam in [201] propose to reduce the space
to be explored: instead of working on individual headers, thy use sets of packets
which are equivalent from the viewpoint of forwarding, called classes of equivalence
or Forwarding Equivalence Class (FEC), and a symbolic representation is adopted to
reduce computational complexity.
Experiments conducted by the same researchers, as well as other research groups
[20], support their idea. The code of these experiments is available at [203].
6.1.4 The Atomic Predicates Verifier
As it can be seen from [201, 204, 205] AP Verifier is not specifically designed for soft-
ware defined networks, however works such as [194, 94, 114] show that this method-
ology is also applicable in the of the SDNs.
The methodology is explained below by analyzing the following steps:
1. Definition of a model of the network suitable for verification.
2. Definition of atomic predicates.
3. Algorithm for calculating atomic predicates
4. Check the network using atomic predicates.
5. System update in real time.
In step 1 the model of the network adopted in the system is defined, in steps 2
and 3 the theoretical bases necessary to carry out the verification and updates re-
ferred to in steps 4 and 5 are set.
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Specifically, we get to show that each network predicate can be uniquely repre-
sented as the logical dis-junction of a set of atomic predicates; moreover, since each
element has an integer identifier, it is possible to represent the state of the network
by a set of integers, thus obtaining a symbolic representation.
In this new space, indicated by [94] like quotient space, the operations of union
and intersection of headers map to operations of union and intersection of sets of
integers, thus improving temporal performances with respect to [104], which uses
ternary bit vectors instead.
The network is modeled as a direct graph of devices, so the links are unidirec-
tional.
Each device has a set of full duplex physical ports and a list of rules applied ac-
cording to the longest prefix match criterion. Inside a device the ports are all connected
together.
There are two types of rules:
• Access Control Lists (ACL), consisting of a predicate of match and action.
• Forwarding Rules or forwarding consist of a match predicate, based on a prefix
and its length, and an output port.
The boolean functions, or predicates, used for the match of the packets are rep-
resented by Binary Decision Diagrams (BDD), an acyclic direct graph data structure
whose nodes represent Boolean variables; each node of a BDD has an low child and an
high child and the arcs linked to child nodes represent the assignment of the false and
true value to the node variable, respectively. The evaluation of a predicate proceeds
recursively by choosing the child up or down based on the value of the variable, up
to the result of the evaluation reaching a terminal node true or false [1].
The choice of BDD is the result of a comparative analysis carried out in [204],
which takes into consideration three other data structures: packet sets [65], Firewall
Decision Diagrams (FDD) [78] and finally the wildcard expressions [104]; the results of
the study show that BDDs enjoy the following properties:
1. Uniqueness of representation: the representation of a set of packages with
BDD or FDD is unique, while there are multiple wildcard expression and packet
set for the same set.
118 Chapter 6. TechNETium: a SDN tool to Verify Security Network Policies
2. efficiency in compute calculation: the computation of the BDD and FDD com-
plement is very simple because it is enough to exchange terminal nodes of the
graph, while for the other data structures one could have an increase in size.
3. small size: to represent a set of packages identified by a header suffix, the
FDDs and emphs packet sets require structures whose dimensions are expo-
nential with respect to the suffix length. It is shown instead that the BDD rep-
resentation of an ACL rule has at most (2 + 2h) nodes where (h) is the length
of the headers, while for a forwarding rule we have at most (2 + n nodes with
(n) equal to the number of bits in an IP. The linear dependency of the dimen-
sions from the length of the headers makes memory consumption and compu-
tational complexity manageable, since the logical conjunction and disjunction
requires a time proportional to the size of the BDD [204].
In algorithm [201] the algorithms used to extract BDDs from ACLs and forward-
ing tables are illustrated. In the following section, the theory of atomic predicates
is explained in more detail, and some improvements for its application to network
verification are proposed.
6.2 Atomic Predicates for Transformations
6.2.1 Definition of Atomic Predicates
The fundamental idea of the method of atomic predicates consists in the representa-
tion of port predicates through the equivalence classes that are forwarded through
the corresponding port. The representation with BDD is flanked by the set of equiv-
alence classes that pass through the predicate gate. This is possible because within
each device the packets belonging to an FEC are forwarded on a single port, there-
fore the predicates are seen as disjoint sets of equivalence classes. At this point a
further step is taken: the equivalence classes are uniquely associated with integer
identifiers. It follows that the set of identifiers of the equivalence classes that pass
through a port is equivalent to the original information of the predicate and can be
used for calculating the properties of the network. The equivalence between these
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representations is demonstrated in [201, 204, 205] and is indicated in [156] as equiva-
lence of Yang and Lam.
In this way the disjunction and conjunction operations on the predicates are mapped
on union and intersection operations on sets of integers, with a considerable reduc-
tion in complexity.
Definition 5. Atomic Predicates Considered P as a set of Predicates, the corresponding
Atomic Predicates set {a1, a2, . . . , ak} follow this rules:
1. For each i = 1...k; ai 6= f alse.
2.
∨k
i=1 ai = true.
3. ai ∧ aj = f alse se i 6= j.
4. Every predicates p ∈ P is the results of logical disjunction of a unique set of atomic
predicates:
p =
∨
i∈S(p)
ai, where S(p) ⊆ {1, ...,k} (6.1)
This implies that p can be represented as S(p) and there a direct correspondence from
disjunction and conjunction operator p1 awn p2 and the union and intersection oper-
ation S(p1) and S(p2).
5. k is the minimum natural integer {p1, p2, ..., pk} that follow those 4 conditions.
Theorem 1. Atomic Predicates and Equivalence Classes
It has been proven [201] that in a given a set of Predicates P , the P Atomic Predicates set is
the minimum set of equivalence class of every packet.
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FIGURE 6.2: Atomic predicates Verifier - Differences between header
space and quotient space
In the example shown in Figure 6.2, taken from [20], we illustrate the differences
between atomic predicates and analysis in header space:
For simplicity, suppose we have 2-bit long headers. In the image we have two
routers that adopt longest match semantics: in the first one there is only one rule
that involves the forwarding of all the input (wildcard expression (**)) of the p0 port
on the p1 port, in the second router is specified that the traffic with prefix (1 *) must
be forwarded to port 3, the rest of the traffic must flow to the p2 port instead.
Using NetPlumber [105] we would have 3 rule nodes, one for each rule, an intra-
table dependency in the second router table and an pipe filter for port 2 of the type:
(** - 1 *). Furthermore, the difference between the two prefixes, which in this sim-
ple case is (0 *), must be computed at runtime, requiring an expensive operation of
intersection between wildcard expressions.
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We will now evaluate the verification with atomic predicates. First, the port pred-
icates are calculated from the forwarding rules, then the FECs that are only two are
calculated: the set of packages that are forwarded to p2 ((** - 1 *), or (0 *)), labeled
with “ 2 "and the set of packets forwarded to p3, labeled with“3" . After that each
port predicate is represented as the union of the FECs:
1. ∗∗ = {2,3}
2. 1∗ = {3}
3. ∗ ∗ −1∗ = {2}
As again pointed out by [20] and by the tables in [201, 204] the approach to atomic
predicates is in most cases 1 or 2 orders of magnitude faster than header space anal-
ysis in calculating reachability, which has been our choice for the data plane verifi-
cation tool.
6.2.2 Calculation of atomic predicates
Once demonstrated that atomic predicates correspond to equivalence classes, we
need a way to extrapolate them quickly from a set of port predicates. For this pur-
pose we need the following two formulas and the algorithm inspired by [201].
Theorem 2. Atomic Predicates, Cardinality Set 1Given a Predicate p we denote A({p})
as the set of atomic predicates of the set compose only by the predicate p and:
A({p}) =

{true} se p = true or f alse
{p,¬p} else
(6.2)
Theorem 3. Atomic Predicates of the union of two sets of predicates Given P1 =
{b1,b2, . . . ,bm} e P2 = {c1, c2, . . . , cn} 2 Atomic Predicates set. AP = {a1, a2, . . . , ak} is the
result of:
{ai = bi1 ∧ ci2 |ai 6= f alse, i1 = {1, ...,m}, i2 = {1, . . . ,n}} (6.3)
AP = A({P1 ∪ P2}) in [201].
The following algorithm applies the given formulas given to calculate the atomic predi-
cates of a set of one element and the union of two sets to obtain the atomic predicates of an
arbitrary set of predicates.
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Algorithm 1 Atomic Predicates calculation algorithm
Input: set of predicates {p1, p2, . . . , pN}
Output: atomic predicates input set, A({p1, p2, . . . , pN})
1: for i = 1 to N do
2: Compute A({pi}) using (6.2)
3: end for
4: for i = 2 to N do
5: Compute A({p1, ..., pi}) using (6.3) with A({p1, ..., pi−1}) e A({pi})
6: end for
7: return A({p1, . . . , pN});
Note that it is possible to apply the formulas (6.2) and (6.3) within a single cycle.
The system maintains two distinct sets of predicates: one for ACLs, one for forward-
ing rules. Each of these two sets can be calculated through the algorithm following
two criteria that provide different performances.
1. criteria for sorting of the MBF ACL:
• Random selection: ACLs are processed in random order.
• Smallest ACL first: first select the ACLs with a smaller number of rules.
2. Criteria for ordering the forwarding rules:
• Random selection: the rules are processed in random order.
• Selection by box: the rules related to the same are processed together
middlebox.
loop and black holes detection
As already seen, the loops are detected during the construction of the policy tree.
We consider exclusively the packet-drops due to the absence of forwarding rules in
the routers, not the ACL that explicitly discard the traffic. If the difference between
the set of all the atomic predicates and the union of all the atomic predicates of a
forwarding table is empty, then the table has no black holes, because it means that
all the traffic received is treated. Or:
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S(true)−
k⋃
i=1
S(Fi) = ∅ =⇒ No black holes in the table (6.4)
Where S(true) is the set of every atomic predicates and k is the number of port
indicates on the table.
Network slicing
A slice network is a set of ports and a set of forwarding and access control rules.
Given two slice Slice1 and Slice2 we consider T1 and T2 the sets of gates, SF1 and SF2
the sets of forwarding rules and SA1 and SA2 the sets of the ACL rules of the two
slice; these overlap if and only if:
T1 ∩ T2 6= ∅ ∨ SA1 ∩ SA2 6= ∅ ∨ SF1 ∩ SF2 6= ∅ (6.5)
6.2.3 Graph updates
Updating links
Alterations in the state of the topology do not modify the atomic predicates, however
the police tree could vary and an update is therefore necessary:
• Link down:retrieve the nodes from the policy tree hashtable and delete the
entire subtree from the table from the link.
• Link up: retrieve the nodes from the policy tree hashtable and extend the tree
by searching depth first starting from the port involved.
Update of rules
When the rules are updated, three operations must be performed:
1. Verifies that the port predicates are altered and possible recalculation.
2. Updating atomic predicates.
3. Updating the reachability tree item.
Operations 2 and 3 can be carried out concurrently.
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Update of port predicates
To make updating possible, the rules are organized in a forest. Each tree is con-
structed by iterating over the forwarding table of a device and setting the rules
whose prefix is contained in the current prefix as daughters of the current rule. In
this way a set of tuples is saved in each tree:
< Pre f ixi, Lengthi, Porti, Ri >
Where Pre f ix, Length are used for the match, Port is the output interface, while Ri
is given by the predicate obtained by eliminating the rules prefixes daughters from
Pre f ixi according to the following formula:
Ri = Pre f ixi ∧ (
∨
j∈C(i)
¬Pre f ixj) (6.6)
Where C(i) is the set of child rules of the rule (i).
The predicate of the port x, Px, is obtained then as the disjunction of the predi-
cates Ri of the rules that direct the forwarding on it:
Px =
∨
porti=portx
Ri (6.7)
Let’s see how the tree is used in the event of rule updates:
1. rule deletion: if the rule i is deleted, its children are assigned to the parent rule
j, and the tree is updated by replacing it in Rj the predicate of the removed rule
i.
Rj← Rj ∨ Ri
If the rule i forwards packets to the port x and the parent rule j forwards to
the port y, it must be removed from the port predicate Px. The predicate of the
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deleted rule Ri and add it instead to Py:
Px← Px ∧ ¬Ri
Py← Py ∨ Ri
2. Adding a rule: if a rule is added i, it is first added to the reference tree accord-
ing to the criteria seen above. If the rule j is the parent of i, the match predicate
of the new rule must be removed from the parent rule:
Rj← Rj ∧ ¬Pre f ixi
The predicates of port are then modified in a dual manner to the previous case:
Px← Px ∨ Ri
Py← Py ∧ ¬Ri
Updating of atomic predicates
There are of course two cases:
1. Addition of a predicate: just apply the formula (6.3), to calculate the atomic
predicates of the union of two sets.
2. Deletion of a predicate Pj: the old set of atomic predicates is still representa-
tive of the set of port predicates, but some predicates could be redundant.
To minimize the set of atomic predicates we consider all the atomic predicates
that represented Pj: of these the ones that are not used in the description of other
gate predicates are eliminated. The complete algorithm is described in [204].
6.2.4 Improvements Introduced
With the update algorithm we are able to maintain a temporary tree in the event of
a rule update. Reachability queries thus can be answered anytime without waiting
for the atomic predicates to be updated. Updating, taking 10 ms on average in our
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test-beds, occurs concurrently. The temporary tree is expanded with the new unre-
solved predicates, causing a slight decrease in efficiency as for [106].
If the unsolved predicates are in a number less than a certain threshold (config-
urable) and there are no changes of atomic predicates it is sufficient to calculate the
AP representation of the new predicates. Vice versa if the number of unresolved
predicates exceeds the threshold or if the set of atomic predicates has changed, the
temporary tree is eliminated and a new one is calculated.
Essential for the functioning of the system is the concept of forwarding equivalence
class, already applied in [106] and cited in [105] for the implementation of a dis-
tributed version of NetPlumber. The demonstration that the representation in atomic
predicates is a representation of the network equivalent to the original one is equally
fundamental. These two principles have inspired numerous further studies includ-
ing [20, 99, 156, 194, 94, 114, 210, 88].
Some limitations emerge at this point. First of all, the network model excludes a
priori any device that modifies packets, cutting out widespread cases such as NAT,
MPLS, IP-in-IP tunnels. However, the theory has been extended to include some
types of changes in [202], although, to the best of our knowledge, a version of this
upgraded library is not yet available. Furthermore, as we have seen, the forwarding
rules only use the IP address to construct the match predicates. A solution for the
application of the method to the SDN consists in the use of the headers indicated in
the OpenFlow specification [185], instead of just the IP address.
Finally, considering the BDDs, [20] suggests the use of a more efficient data structure
for the representation of predicates, attributing to BDDs an overhead due to the ex-
cessive number of calls to library functions. It is also known from [1] that the BDDs
are sensitive to the ordering of the variables: an incorrect ordering can lead to a sen-
sible efficiency reduction of the system.
For these reasons, an important part of the work presented in this chapter has been
focused on improving the current state of the art tools to attenuate or remove such
limitations. Our contributions include:
1. HashTable: a "reverse" tree is kept in a hash-table for each reachability tree.
This table correlates a port and the reachability tree nodes that refer to it, to
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update trees more quickly.
2. Ports along the route: all common ports are kept in the path from s a d, to ease
loop detection.
3. Complementary set of atomic predicates: if a set of atomic predicates, used to
represent a predicate, becomes larger than half of S(true), save the complement
of the set with respect to S(true) instead of the original set, to save space.
4. OpenFlow Integration: is it possible now to feed the BDD with OpenFlow
rules taken from the SDN controller (as it is shown in the next section using
ONOS).
5. Multiple Match Key Forwarding Rule: Thanks to the OpenFlow and ONOS
integration we are also able to use three different type of matching keys for the
forwarding rules: exact-ip, ternary, and long-prefix match.
6. Improved domain atomic predicates to integer translation: We rewrote the
algorithm for the domain conversion from to integer tree implementing a cache
that keep track of the last conversions.
6.3 TechNETium, a verification data plane tool
In this section we will show TechNETium our security policy checker tool.
A core security design of our tool is Model Driven Development (MDD) [52, 45,
11], an approach that adopts Unified Modeling Language (UML) as domain-specific
modeling language. The goal of MDD is to model entities, relations and behaviors
of the elements of the system as high-level abstractions.
In the Model Driven Development approach, the definition of the specific domain
of the problem to be modeled is required. In TechNETium, this involves both secu-
rity and networking verification tools. We herein summarize the general concepts
behind the MDD implementation useful to understand our contributions; further
details can be found in our work in [126].
. TechNETium exploits a network model-checking based on policies. By policy we
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mean a variant aspect of any network (forwarding) mechanism, i.e., a desirable high-
level goal expressed in the form of a rule or a configuration. We build a network
model to formally check if those policies are met. The basic idea is to create and
maintain a model of the network and a set of policies that such model must satisfy.
Consequently, the model allows to continuously verify whether or not the policy set
is satisfied on the network.
As specified in the previous section, we consider the SDN paradigm as the enabler
for this technology, since it natively exhibits the separation between the data plane
level and the control plane.
The aim of TechNETium is to be totally portable and architecture-independent. For
this purpose, it is written in Java; however, to perform a first test we choose a specific
architecture on which to deploy it: ONOS[16]. This choice was motivated by several
factors. First of all, ONOS offers a large set of APIs and methods for managing the
network, a necessary requirement to be able to quickly obtain data about network
topology elements such as: devices, links, ports, hosts and forwarding rules.
ONOS is also one of the best open source controllers in terms of performance [16].
• High Throughput: up to 1M requests/second
• Low Latency: 10 - 100 ms event processing
• Global Network State Size: up to 1TB of data
• High Availability
ONOS has been also proven one of the best controller for DoS attack tolerance [4]
compared to the main open source alternatives.
TechNETium is a architecture composed of two main modules that work on two lev-
els of an SDN architecture stack. At the Data Plane level, through the predicates of
a typical SDN controller, generates a representation of the network model using the
previously described atomic predicate technique. The result of this graph will there-
fore represent a snapshot of all the possible paths of a data traffic divided according
to the flow rules of the switches.
The Control Plane level module, on the other hand, will input a "high level" security
policy defined and described by the user and / or network administrator, and will
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perform the verification of this by computing it on the atomic predicate graph, in the
form of Reachability and ToWayPoint queries.
6.3.1 Atomic Predicates BDD generator
The first part of TechNETium creates the atomic predicates trees. Following what
has been described in section 6.2 according to the atomic predicates theory, we need
two distinct sets of data to generate it:
• Physical data related to switches and hosts (links, ports, interfaces);
• All the installed flow rules.
From these two sets a PolicyGraph is then created. It represents the whole set of
possible paths of a packet within the network, according to the currently installed
flow rules. As underlined in 6.2 we have been inspired by the AP Verifier tool de-
scribed in [205], but we introduced many improvements in terms of performance
and efficiency.
The BBD generator has been integrated as a core service of the ONOS Engine. In
this way we can easily query the extended classes of the Topology module of ONOS
to query it and obtain the dataset of the network devices, links and hosts and the
correspondent flow rules, to create the BDD tree of atomic predicates.
6.3.2 Policy Checker Application
Once the BDD tree has been created, it is possible to verify the security network
policy. The strength of TechNETium is that a policy is simply seen as a property
of the network. A property can then be formally verified on its representation as
BDD. However, to make the whole process automatic and user-customizable, Tech-
NETium can interpret the high-level policy defined by the user by breaking it down
into elementary graph operations. The user is enabled to define a policy as de-
sired properties regarding the routing of network traffic through the various nodes,
while the policy verification is efficiently implemented as a sequence of Reachability
checks. In our case study, the policy manager has been created as an ONOS appli-
cation, with its own graphical interface allowing to insert the security policy and to
130 Chapter 6. TechNETium: a SDN tool to Verify Security Network Policies
launch the verification.
To validate our approach we implemented the Reachability policy (obviously) and
we provided two examples showing how to define composite policies based on
Reachability, namely the FullReachability and ToWayPoint policies:
• FullReachability (A,B) holds true if there is Reachability from A to B AND from
B to A
• ToWayPoint (A,B,C) holds true if every existing path from A to C must pass
through B.
The Reachability policy can be verified as a property of the BDD tree. The atomic
predicates representation allows us to calculate the set of packets that can reach a
destination port starting from source port using the following algorithm:
Algorithm 2 Reachability algorithm from port s to port d
Input: S(F1), . . . ,S(Fj): quotient space representation of forwarding predicates
among the path s and d (F1, F2, ..., Fj)
Input: S(A1), . . . ,S(Ak): quotient space representation of access control predicates
among path between s and d (A1, A2, ..., Ak)
Output: set of packets that can effectively reach d from s
1: SF← SF ∩ S(F1) ∩ . . . ∩ S(Fj)
2: if SF = ∅ then
3: return f alse
4: end if
5: SA← SA ∩ S(A1) ∩ . . . ∩ S(Ak)
6: if SA = ∅ then
7: return f alse;
8: end if
9: return SF, SA
We can then use the verification algorithm to calculate the reachability tree of a
given port by performing a depth-first search by injecting all packets (SA and SF)
into the port. A search branch is interrupted at a port x if:
1. (SA or SF) becomes empty.
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2. The port x is an output port and it is not connected to any input port.
3. The port x is the entry port of a box without exit ports. The port x has already
been visited (loop detected).
In this example (taken from [201]) we have both forwarding and ACL rules, indi-
cated for a port such as SF and SA or as two separate integer lists from “;” following
“forwarding_ap ; acl_ap”.
FIGURE 6.3: Atomic Predicates Verifier - Example reachability net-
work
The network has six atomic predicates for forwarding and two for access control.
The input port port1 accepts all packets as input and forwards the predicates 4,5,6
to the port port2 and the predicates 1,2,3 to the port port3.
FIGURE 6.4: Atomic Predicates Verifier - Port reachability tree port1
for the network shown in the figure (6.3)
The reachability tree saves in each node: a port, and the identifiers of the predi-
cates that can reach the port (forwarding) and of the predicates that can pass through
it (ACL).
In any case the backtracking is performed and the search is carried out until there are
no more ports to analyze. At the end we get a tree whose nodes are given by a port
number and the set of packets that can arrive there.
The FullReachability and the ToWayPoint policy as a consequence are decomposed
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as high-level policies to a set of reachability ones. This because when a model check-
ing tool is able to construct the reachability graph of a system, it can in principle
answer any reachability question by simply examining this graph [27].
The FullReachability policy is just a simple example of this kind of decomposition.
It express the Reachability from A to B in a duplex way, for this reason is it simply
calculated as:
FullReachability(A, B) = Reachability(A, B) ∧ Reachability(B, A) (6.8)
and no need for an additional reachability graph is necessary.
The ToWayPoint policy is more complex and it calls for a modification of the reacha-
bility graph. In order to be expressed in terms of Reachability, ToWayPoint is defined
as follows. Considering:
α 6= β,ω 6= α,ω 6= β (6.9)
The figure 6.5 shows an extract of the policy verification management interface.
Once the policies are defined and installed it is possible to launch the verification.
FIGURE 6.5: Policy Verifier ONOS Interface
These policies, however simple, can be considered the first step for a network
administrator to define his security policies for network management. In fact, con-
sidering the most common network attacks such as distributed / reflection denial of
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service, network administrators can use this policy in a proactive or reactive mode:
Reactively, e.g. by isolating an entire network or sub-network or single node from
which malicious traffic originates, and verifying their effective isolation with reach-
ability policies.
Proactively, e.g. by redirecting a suspicious traffic flow on a specific subnet, or a
honey-net, where NFVs can be installed with diagnostic / deep packet inspection
tools to analyse the aforementioned traffic in more detail. An example of such use
case scenario has been shown in our in work [125].
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FIGURE 6.6: Average BDD creation time.
In this section we will describe some of the main experiments/test we performed.
The goals of such tests were mainly 3:
• Showing the performances of the network graph creation.
• Showing the performance difference for reachability verification with related
works such NetPlumber.
• Showing the performance difference for generic policy verification with related
works such NetPlumber.
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FIGURE 6.7: Policy time check after a link up / link down upgrade
and node, links and forwarding rules increase.
The experiments were performed on several virtualbox dual-core virtual ma-
chines with 4 GB of Ram and Ubuntu Linux 18.04 operating system. The network
sample that we used is the i2 Standford Network1.
This network is composed of 161 Nodes, 11450 Links, and 77451 Forwarding
Rules.
The first set of tests has been made to verify the performances on the BDD graph cre-
ation. We executed TechNETium increasing the amount of 3 different items: links,
nodes and rules. As a result of these numbers, we have therefore measured the cre-
ation time of the BDD fee.
On graphs 6.6 we can see the required time for TechNETium to create the BDD in
3 different ways. Increasing the number of nodes, of links, and of forwarding rules
given as a incremental percentage of the total network. As we predicted, the growth
of creation time is roughly linear in the number of links and nodes.
Considering the forwarding rules, instead, the time increases linearly up to 60% of
1https://uit.stanford.edu/service/network/internet2
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FIGURE 6.8: Policy time check after a link up / link down upgrade
and node, links and forwarding rules increase.
the rules, then it stabilizes. This is due to the fact that we increase the forwarding
rules shuffling them at every step but in a equivalent number for each device. For
this reason, after a certain threshold the complexity of the network due to the calcu-
lation of all possible paths of a packet becomes constant.
The second set of tests that we performed aimed to calculate the policy verification
time while upgrading the reachability graph. We calculated the time required to ver-
ify the same policy changing the network graph as we previously did it, increasing
the number of nodes, links and forwarding rules.
Graphs 6.7 shows the results of such tests. The left graph shows the time to verify
an increasing number of Reachability policies when adding or removing one link.
These events modify the reachability graph, yet the verification time still increases
linearly with the number of policies only. This is a relevant test that demonstrates
that the atomic predicates techniques implemented by TechNETium is efficient with
respect to graph updates, which is one of the main requirements for this kind of
tools.
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The graph on the right confirms this result generalizing the test approach. The ver-
ification time linearly increases with the cardinalities of the sets of nodes, links, and
forwarding rules. There is only an anomalous behavior after the inclusion of the
70% of forwarding rules set. In this case the behavior is due to the fact that, as the
forwarding rules increase, many more direct links are configured so that the reacha-
bility is much more likely to be successful in less time.
Finally we tested the performance difference between the NetPlumber tool (based on
Hassel header space analysis) and TechNETium with atomic predicates. Those tests
aims to proof that the BDD based policy verification on a large scale is definitely
more efficient. For this reason we tested the three developed policies (Reachabil-
ity, FullReachability and ToWayPoint) increasing the policies number between 1 and
1000.
From graphs 6.8 we can therefore infer some important data. Policy verification
with TechNETium is 3 orders of magnitude more efficient. The growth is also lin-
ear for both, therefore the performance difference grows with the number of policies
to be verified. Furthermore, linear growth is different. While NetPlumber shows
a growth, albeit small, in the verification times with the increase in the number of
policies due to the size of the reachability graph this is much less evident on Tech-
NETium, whose growth is much less pronounced.
This analysis is valid for Reachability and FullReachability but it is even more evi-
dent in the case of the ToWayPoint policy. In fact, in this policy a reachability test
including a unreachable node is part of the policy definition (as defined in 6.3). Ver-
ifying a false reachability property for NetPlumber is very expensive in the worst
case, while on the tree of atomic predicates, being a logical AND, the complexity in
the worst case does not change.
6.5 Future Works
Future developments of this work include several improvements at every stack level.
From the application point of view we are currently working on a better user im-
prove the Policy creation and its management, with an improved and simpler graphic
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interface where policies are defined already at the application level through a "lan-
guage of reachabilities".
From a development point of view another interesting future development can be
the deployment of TechNETium into other SDN controller as Ryu, OpenDayLight
and POX.
Finally additionally, recent years have seen how P4 language is becoming increas-
ingly popular among SDN data plane solutions. P4 is a language to configure switches.
Precisely, P4 is an open source programming language that lets end users describe
how networking gear should process the packet. It controls processor chips and net-
work forwarding devices. The main paradigm change is to switch from a bottoms-
up approach where fixed-function switches are built-in, to a programmable top-
down approach where the user decide which functionalities wants and install.
The possibilities it offers to be able to modify the data plane and display new in-
formation and aggregated data at the switch level offer numerous opportunities to
plan significant improvements in performance and usability. For this reason we are
currently working on a integration of TechNETium into a programmable data plane
P4-based. The main idea will be to use the advantages of PDP to produce, expose
and use additional metadata information produced by the data plane.
6.6 Conclusions
In this chapter we presented TechNETium, a architecture that exploits several tech-
niques such as atomic predicates transformation[204], SDN and model driven devel-
opment[45] to formally verify custom security policies. The architecture is composed
of two parts:
1. The Atomic Predicates graph generator, that builds the Atomic Predicates Graph
which represent the state of the network.
2. The Policy Manager, which enable the user to define its own security policy.
TechNETium will then compile the output of this phase in a sequence of reach-
ability policies and verify them.
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In order to validate our architecture we deployed it into a well known SDN con-
troller, ONOS and we performed several tests to proof the improvements of the per-
formances compared to the state of the art tools.
We argued that an abstracted development model approach for the policy manage-
ment level is necessary to exploit the power of SDN, and we show-cased it imple-
menting two additional custom policies. We argued with some use case that this
architecture is suited for a typical system network administrator who wants to for-
mally verify his own custom policies.
Related work includes similar tools with different techniques for the network verifi-
cation level [88, 2, 132]. As we already discussed NetPlumber[103] is the tool which
has been create with our same goal, but we showed that we definitely improved the
performances. Veriflow [106] do not focus on custom policies but only on network
invariant in order to detect network changes. MineSwepper [15] otherwise use an
SMT solver to analyse all possible routing paths in order to verify network proper-
ties, but without the possibility to implement custom ones. The most similar tool
in the literature is obviously AP Verifier[205]. As we pointed out TechNETium has
been inspired by this tool, it uses the atomic predicates techniques and the main
algorithm for the reachability graph creation. As specified in 6.2.4 we introduced
several improvements defined by the same authors of AP Verifier and we also built
the Policy Manager module. To the best of our knowledge, there isn’t in the liter-
ature such tool which include a Formal Verification network tool based on Atomic
Predicate technique, with a Policy Manager integrated into an SDN controller cre-
ated with a Model Driven Development Approach.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions
This thesis illustrates the main outcomes of the research activities conducted through-
out the three years of the Ph.D. program. An original cybersecurity analysis of the
main threats in service enabler architectures.
In chapter 2 I started with a review of the state-of-the-art of the current new service
oriented software architecture.
After that, I defined an analysis path, based on a top-down approach of the software
architecture based on the orchestration level of the enabled services.
Next, I developed a real-world use case for each level identified, that is:
• a Clearing System in chapter 4.1.
• a Service Enabler Platform called SMAll in 5.
• a Software Defined Full-Stack Architecture in 6.2 called techNETium.
The main contributions consists of an analysis of all the major threats and vul-
nerability on such architectures. In order to do that I firstly studied a categorization
of the architecture components.
For this reason in 4.1.2 I proposed a snapshot management system to organize the
clearing system components. In 5.2 I proposed a MaaS Stack for a generic mobility
service enabling platform and, finally, in 6.3 I developed application layer for secu-
rity policy definition in a software defined network environment.
I supported and proved these contributions with practical attacks on the use cases
developed. As a consequence, I also proposed a set of architectural solutions for
aforementioned threats.
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I believe that this work opens up a plethora of novel possibilities in research as well
as in any entity interested in building new service enabler software architecture.
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